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This Article explores the division of war-making authority  
between the President and Congress through the prism of positive political theory.  For 
the most part, the scholarly treatment of the war-powers debate has been normative with 
various commentators offering various textual or functional accounts of what the proper 
allocation of war-making authority should be.  This Article provides a positive account of 
the war-making powers by focusing on the domestic political constraints that the political 
branches face in the context of an imminent international crisis.  This Article argues that 
the presidential decision to seek congressional authorization is determined by a two-level 
strategic interaction.  At the domestic level, once the President decides to initiate conflict, 
he has an incentive to seek congressional authorization as a form of political insurance 
for the domestic audience  if he believes that the war is going to be fairly long or costly, or 
if he is uncertain about the immediate prospects of victory.  At the international level, the 
President also has an incentive to seek congressional authorization if he is uncertain 
about the outcome of the conflict and wants to send a costly signal to the foreign enemy 
about the country’s resolve to prosecute the conflict.  In sum, the ex ante beliefs of the 
President regarding the outcome of a conflict and the possibility of subsequent 
punishment by a domestic audience ultimately determine his decision to seek 
congressional authorization.  Finally, this Article also argues that Congress has an 
incentive to constrain the President’s war-making agenda in the shadow of a politically 
unpopular war.  But while the President often shapes public opinion in his war powers 
role, Congress tends to react to public opinion when it constrains the President’s war 
powers initiatives.  Rather than follow public opinion and withdraw from a politically 
unpopular war, the President is more likely to escalate the war and gamble that the 
course of the war and public opinion will change in his favor.  Thus, a presidential 
decision to withdraw from an unpopular war is more likely to be a result of congressional 
intervention than a reaction to negative public opinion. This Article uses historical case 
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INTRODUCTION 
Contemporary media accounts of most extant American uses of force, including 
the ongoing Iraqi crisis, are often rife with speculation about when American military 
involvement will end.1 From an institutional perspective, however, the bigger challenge 
is to understand the diverse and sometimes inconsistent roles that the political branches 
play in initiating and terminating wars.  For instance, following the pattern set by previous 
administrations, President Bush, rather than Congress, took the lead in initiating the war 
in Iraq.  But why was President Bush able to do so?  Also, why do presidents sometimes 
seek congressional approval when they initiate certain wars but not others?  What is the 
likelihood that the President will take the lead in ending the current American military 
involvement in Iraq?  Are there specific circumstances that dictate when the President 
will take the lead in terminating a conflict and when the President will follow Congress’s 
lead?  As a practical matter, does the Constitution actually play a role in resolving any of 
these quandaries?   
 
1 See, e.g., Frederick Barton, et al., Should We Stay or Should We Go?, NY TIMES, January 19, 2005 
at A 19; David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, Washington Memo; Hot Topic: How U.S. Might Disengage in Iraq,
NY TIMES, January 10, 2005, at A1. 
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Although there is a plethora of legal scholarship on war powers, hardly any of it 
focuses on the actual dynamics of political branch relations on war powers.  Rather, much 
of the scholarship tends to advance competing normative claims about the proper division 
of war powers.  On one side of the debate, pro-President scholars stress the importance of 
strength and flexibility in an executive that is not fettered in his foreign policy goals by 
parochial legislators.2 On the other side of the debate, pro-Congress scholars argue that a 
legislative check on the President’s foreign policy actions encourages democratic 
accountability and effective scrutiny.3 While the gulf between these two camps in the war 
powers debate is quite extensive, they both seem to be in agreement on one point:  
Congress is relatively impotent in war powers.4
What is lacking in these debates, however, is a coherent theoretical account of 
how the President and Congress actually interact on war powers issues.  In other words, if 
Congress is so weak, why would the President ever seek congressional authorization to go 
to war?  Conversely, if the President is so powerful, why is Congress sometimes able to 
constrain his national security choices?  
 
This Article attempts to fill the gap in the war powers debate by presenting a 
theoretical framework that seeks to answer these questions. Employing the tools and 
insights of positive political theory, this Article explores the division of war-making 
authority between the President and Congress by focusing on the domestic audience 
constraints that the political branches face in the context of an imminent military buildup 
or troop deployment.  This Article assumes that at the conflict initiation stage, the 
President enjoys an agenda setting advantage over Congress because he has the power to 
influence the public’s appetite for going to war.  In other words, because the President has 
the exclusive ability to create and escalate an international crisis, he can effectively lock-
in the other branches of government to his preferred course of military action knowing 
that any institutional actor that attempts to back out of the crisis will likely face 
punishment by a domestic audience.  Thus, by precipitating “back out” costs and a “rally 
around the flag effect” among the domestic audience, the President can effectively 
constrain the scope of Congress’s war-powers.  
 
Given the President’s apparent dominance over the crisis escalation agenda at the 
initiation of a conflict, however, why would the President ever seek Congress’s approval 
2 John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War 
Powers, 84 CAL L. REV. 167, 303-304 (1996); see also William Treanor, Fame, Founding, and the Power to 
Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695, 696 (1997) (listing those scholars that advocate a pro-presidential 
view of war powers).  
3 See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER 
THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 205-06 (1996); JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY 4-5 (1993); W. 
TAYLOR REVELEY III, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 72 (1981).  
4 See  Harold Koh, Why the President(Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran 
Contra Affair, 97 YALE L. J. 1255 (1988); see also LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION ON WAR 
AND SPENDING (2000); see also REVELEY, supra note __ at 134; ELY, supra note __at 48; Yoo, supra note __, 
at 182. 
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before going to war?  After all, the courts rarely ever intervene in separation of powers 
disputes regarding war-making authority and members of Congress who stand in the way 
of the President’s war-making decisions face significant electoral risks.5
The answer is that the President’s control over the war-making agenda is neither 
exclusive nor complete.  Indeed, although the President may dominate the “rally around 
the flag” effect at the conflict initiation stage, he has less control over the course and 
outcome of any specific war, such as the monetary and psychological costs of the war, how 
long the war will last, or whether failure or stalemate can be avoided.  As the President’s 
ex-ante beliefs of the risks of an unfavorable outcome increase, the President’s calculus of 
the risks involved in going to war without congressional authorization also change.   
 
This Article argues that this calculus is dependent on a two-level strategic 
interaction in which both levels of the interaction are interdependent.  At the domestic 
level, this Article argues that the President is likely to seek congressional authorization as 
a form of political insurance if he believes that there is a significant enough risk that the 
war will go wrong.  In other words, when there is a significant enough risk of military 
failure or stalemate, the President has an incentive to spread the costs of decision-making 
among other political actors in order to prevent those actors from subsequently exploiting 
the President’s misfortunes.  At the international level, the President also has an 
incentive to seek congressional authorization when the outcome of the war is uncertain in 
order to send a costly signal to the foreign adversary about the United States’ resolve to 
prosecute the conflict.  Both of these levels are interdependent because the perception 
that both political branches are not in accord in the prosecution of a conflict may 
embolden a foreign adversary, thereby increasing the chance of military failure or 
stalemate.  In sum, because of the significant domestic audience costs associated with 
failure or stalemate in foreign military engagements (including costly but ultimately 
successful conflicts), the President will be less likely to initiate conflict without 
congressional authorization unless he is assured of relatively rapid military success. 
 
Correspondingly, this theoretical model suggests that Congress also has an 
incentive to constrain the President’s war-making authority in the shadow of an 
unpopular military undertaking.  Indeed, presidents who embark on military adventures 
face an acute dilemma:  while the use of military force is likely to generate a favorable 
public response in the short run, costly or failed military adventures are also likely to 
generate a subsequent backlash by the domestic audience.  Thus, if the President is facing 
possible military failure or stalemate, members of Congress, especially those of the 
opposing party, are usually poised to take advantage of the President’s misfortunes to 
mobilize opposition to the President’s agenda.  On those occasions, members of Congress 
5 See, e.g., Richard Stoll, The Sound of Guns: Is there a Congressional Rally after U.S. Military Action,
15 AMER. POL. Q. 223, 225 (1987); see also James Regens, Ronald Gaddie & Brad Lockerbie, The Electoral 
Consequences of Voting to Declare War, 39 J. CONFLICT RES. 168, 174-75 (1995) (showing that members of 
Congress who opposed the U.S. entry into WWI were less likely to be reelected than those who voted for 
entry but not finding statistically significant differences in Persian Gulf war and Mexican American war). 
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are able to deploy a variety of mechanisms to constrain the President’s war-making 
initiatives, including denial of funds for military engagements, use of procedural devices 
that restrict the scope of presidential decision-making, threats to derail the president’s 
political agenda, and occasionally the threat of impeachment.   The conventional wisdom 
often dismisses such legislative constraints, such as the War Powers Resolution, as being 
useless and purely symbolic. 6 This Article suggests that far from being useless as a 
constraint on the President’s authority, the War Powers Resolution is actually an 
ingenious piece of legislation that allows members of Congress to intervene selectively 
and strategically in war-making decisions once there are clear political payoffs for doing 
so.   
 
This Article also suggests that the role that public opinion plays in the separation 
of war powers between the President and Congress is strikingly different.  While the 
President tries to frame and shape public opinion on use of force decisions, Congress 
tends to react to public opinion.  Members of Congress, including those in the opposition, 
are aware that presidential popularity during an international crisis is often very relevant 
to their electoral fortunes.  When the President’s war initiatives are popular, members of 
Congress from both sides of the spectrum will often jump on the war bandwagon and 
support the President.  When public opinion turns against the President, however, 
members of Congress, including those in the President’s party, seem to be more willing to 
constrain the President’s initiatives.  The President, on the other hand, does not generally 
react to negative public opinion in his war-making initiatives.  Indeed, the President is 
aware that withdrawal of troops in the face of negative public opinion is likely to be 
construed as an admission of failure and incompetence.  Rather than follow the course of 
public opinion when the war is going badly, the President is more likely to entrench 
himself into a war and gamble that the course of the war (and public opinion) will change 
in his favor.   Thus, a presidential decision to withdraw troops from an ongoing 
international crisis in the absence of military victory is more likely to be the result of 
congressional intervention than a response to negative public opinion.  
 
While the theoretical thrust of this Article is decidedly positive, it has significant 
implications for the normative scholarship on war powers.   Most of the normative 
critiques of presidential authority in war powers assume that government agencies or 
bureaucracies are empire builders that seek to maximize their institutional powers.7
These commentators assume that the President has an imperialistic agenda in the 
national security sphere and that Congress will be more proactive in its war-powers role if 
it is provided with better institutional tools.  The theoretical framework laid out in this 
Article suggests that as long as the President has control over the crisis escalation agenda, 
it is unlikely that more sophisticated institutional tools will significantly alter Congress’s 
6 See KOH, supra note __ at 39; ELY, supra note __ at 61; BARBARA HINCKLEY, LESS THAN MEETS 
THE EYE: FOREIGN POLICY MAKING AND THE MYTH OF THE ASSERTIVE CONGRESS 99 (1994).   
7 See Daryl Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 
915-17 (2005) (alluding to prevalence of empire-building approaches in the analysis of separation of 
powers).  
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war powers role.   After the President has escalated an international crisis and mobilized 
the domestic audience in favor of war, there is a strong tendency that Congress will follow 
suit and accede to the President’s wishes.  In other words, electoral payoff factors are 
more likely to influence the congressional role in war powers issues than empire building 
concerns.   Correspondingly, this model also refutes the notion that Congress is impotent 
in foreign affairs because it does not have adequate institutional tools to assert itself 
against the President.  In those instances where there is a discernible electoral payoff for 
constraining the President on war powers issues, Congress has been willing and able to do 
so.8 Given the political incentives that members of Congress face on war powers issues, 
neither better institutional tools nor increased judicial intervention is likely to make 
much of a change to the current war powers landscape. 
 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I presents a positive political theory of the 
war powers constitution by exploring the domestic constraints Congress and the President 
face in the context of imminent military hostilities.  This Part focuses on four key 
questions.  First, how does the President get to exercise dominion over the crisis 
escalation agenda before a conflict is initiated?  How does the President’s ability to 
dominate the escalation agenda influence Congress’s participation in the war powers 
debate? How does uncertainty about the outcome of a war influence the President’s 
decision to seek congressional authorization?  Finally, when is Congress likely to use 
devices, such as the War Powers Resolution, to constrain President’s war-making 
activities?  This Part shows that these four questions can be answered by a two-level game 
of domestic and international interaction in which both domestic audience costs and the 
President’s desire to signal resolve to a foreign adversary influence the actual division of 
war powers.  Part II tests this theory by focusing on four historical case studies of the 
modern use of force, including the 1982-1984 deployment in Lebanon, the 1983 
intervention in Grenada, the 1992-1993 humanitarian intervention in Somalia, and the 
2003 US-led military invasion of Iraq.  The results of these case studies largely support the 
theoretical model.  Lastly, Part III explores some of the implications of this theory for 
normative scholarship in war powers.  More specifically, this Part argues that many of the 
debates about Congress’s proper role in the war powers constitution may be misguided, 
since members of Congress do not act as empire builders when dealing with war powers 
issues, and may be averse to taking steps that increase their institutional power if taking 
such steps makes them electorally vulnerable.  Moreover, this Part also suggests that 
efforts to have the courts police the war powers constitution may ultimately prove to be 
fruitless if members of Congress do not have much of an incentive to assert these war 
powers themselves.9
8 See James Lindsay, Congress and Foreign Policy: Why The Hill Matters, 107 POL. SC. Q. 607, 622-
23 (1992). 
9 See KOH, supra note __ at 148. 
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I. A THEORY OF WAR-MAKING AUTHORITY 
This Part develops an argument that uses rational choice theory to explain the 
actual division of war-making authority between the President and Congress.10 The core 
assumption underlying this theoretical approach is that the relevant institutional actors— 
individual members of Congress and the President—act rationally to advance war powers 
decisions that are consistent with their preferences.  In other words, this approach 
assumes that all of these actors will pursue self-interested goals, that they will respond 
strategically to each other, and they will use institutional structures when necessary to 
advance their goals.  The argument also assumes that the preferences of both the 
President and the individual members of Congress are very heavily influenced by electoral 
concerns, and thus both are very sensitive to the preferences of the domestic political 
audience.  Finally, this argument assumes that the President is sensitive to the preferences 
of the domestic audience not just for electoral reasons, but because he believes a favorable 
domestic audience will help him advance his policy agenda.11 The first section develops 
this theory by spelling out the presidential advantage in framing domestic audience costs 
before the initiation of a conflict.  The second section suggests that uncertainty about the 
possible outcome of a conflict can influence the President’s decision to seek congressional 
authorization before going to war.   
 
A. The Early Executive Advantage: Exclusive Domination over the Crisis 
Escalation Agenda 
In November 2001, almost 16 months before he ordered the invasion of Iraq, 
President Bush explicitly threatened Saddam Hussein to come clean on Iraq’s alleged 
weapons of mass destruction program or else face the consequences.12 When President 
Bush first uttered those words, he did not seem to be doing much more than sending a 
strong signal to Hussein that he should take the UN arms inspection program seriously.  
By fall 2002, however, the President’s warnings against the Iraqi regime had escalated and 
it appeared that President Bush was staking his political reputation on forcefully removing 
Hussein from power.13 When repeated UN inspections failed to disclose any new such 
10 For a useful surveys of rational choice theory, see RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
THE LAW (4th Ed. 1992); DANIEL FARBER & PHILLIP FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL 
INTRODUCTION (1991). 
11 See DAVID P. AUERSWALD, DISARMED DEMOCRACIES 27 (2000) (arguing that even when failure 
does not endanger tenure in office, an executive would prefer international success to failure).  
12 See Bob Deans, Bush: Iraq may be Next, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 27, 2001, at 1A (Bush 
demanded that Hussein comply with the United Nations or “face the consequences.”) 
13 See, e.g., George Bush, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Document, Vol. 38, at 1295 (2002) 
(“The policy of my government . . . is regime change—for a reason”); We Have a Duty to Every Worker . . . in 
America to Punish the Guilty, WASH. POST, September 9, 2002, at A14 (“It's a stated policy of this 
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weapons, and it appeared that the Iraqi authorities were not forthcoming in disclosing 
such weapons, President Bush followed through on his threat and ordered a full-scale 
invasion of Iraq in March 2003.14 
When President Bush originally made his threats against Iraq in late 2001, he was 
not bound to follow through on them by either domestic or international law.  
Nonetheless, by September 2002, public opinion polls seemed to show that a majority of 
Americans believed military action against Iraq was inevitable.15 Such public belief in a 
military response persisted even as key allies of the United States balked at supporting a 
UN Resolution that would authorize military action against Iraq.16 Indeed, Congress 
subsequently granted President Bush the authorization to take action in Iraq even before 
he had publicly made up his mind about whether he wanted to go to war.17
Why did Bush’s threats against Iraq, non-binding as they were, carry such political 
weight?  One possible explanation relates to the expectations of the domestic audience 
during an international crisis.  Political scientists have argued that political leaders in 
democracies suffer from domestic audience costs if they renege on their threats.18 
According to this argument, democracies have an advantage over autocratic regimes in 
signaling credible resolve in military engagements because democratic politicians suffer 
“audience costs” if they make threats that they subsequently fail to fulfill.19 Thus, one 
way to interpret the public response in the build-up to the Iraqi conflict is that the public 
was aware that neither the President nor Congress could really back out of the crisis 
without suffering significant electoral consequences.   
 
A much broader explanation of the President’s actions is that when he threatens a 
foreign adversary he is engaging in a two-level signaling game.  At the international level, 
as the political scientists have observed, when an elected executive issues such threats, he 
government to have a regime change. And it hasn't changed. And we'll use all tools at our disposal to do so. 
. . .”). 
14 David E. Sanger and John F. Burns, Threats and Responses: The White House; Bush Orders Start of 
War on Iraq; Missiles Apparently Miss Hussein, NY TIMES, Mar. 20, 2003, at A1 (describing the first hours of 
the Iraq War.) 
15 Richard Benedetto, President Gains Support for Military Action, USA TODAY, Sep. 18, 2002, at 
6A (Gallup poll revealed that seven out of ten Americans believed war with Iraq was inevitable in the next 
year.); Adam Clymer & Janet Elder, Poll Finds Unease on Terror Fight and Concerns About War on Iraq, 
NY TIMES, Sep. 8, 2002, at 1. 
16See  James M. Lindsay and Caroline Smith, Rally ‘Round the Flag: Opinion in the United States 
before and after the Iraq War, 21 BROOKINGS REVIEW 20, 22 (Summer 2003). 
17 Susan Milligan, Congress Gives Bush OK to Act Alone Against Iraq; Senate Follows House in Voting 
Strong Support, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 11, 2002, at A1. 
18 See James Fearon, Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes, 88 
AMER. POL. SC. REV. 577, 580 (1994) (arguing that a leader who backs down after “engaging the national 
honor” is likely to be seen as suffering greater humiliation the more he had escalated the conflict); Alastair 
Smith, International Crisis and Domestic Politics, 92 AMER. POL. SC. REV. 623, 632 (1998) (“Democratic] 
leaders are able to send credible messages because they mortgage their domestic political survival on their 
ability to honor those commitments”). 
19 See Fearon, supra note __ at 581-582.  
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is essentially saying to the foreign adversary: “My resolve is high because as an elected 
official in a democracy the political costs of backing out of a publicly issued threat are 
high.” 20 At the domestic level, however, President is also sending a distinct signal to the 
other branches of government: “I have committed this country to a course of action by 
initiating this international crisis, and anyone who tries to get us to back out of this 
course of action will suffer significant domestic audience costs.” 21 In other words, the 
existence of domestic audience costs at the crisis escalation stage provides the President 
with a credible tool to coerce the other branches of government, especially Congress, to 
his preferred course of military action.    
 
Members of Congress not only have to contend with possible “audience costs” if 
they try to resist the President’s war agenda at the initiation of a conflict, there are also 
positive political benefits for supporting the President in an international crisis:  the “rally 
around the flag” effect.22 The rally around the flag effect suggests that in the context of 
an international crisis, the public will rally around the President and the flag.23 Indeed, 
when there is an international event such as a war or terrorist attack, the initial patriotic 
impulse to rally around the flag gives the President a decisive boost in power and 
confidence.24 As the President’s public opinion polls soar, members of Congress often find 
it politically beneficial to piggyback on the President’s political momentum and do as he 
wishes.25 
This Article does not make any assumptions about what actually motivates the 
presidential decision to use force, such as whether the President factors in electoral 
concerns in his decision-making process.  What this Article assumes is that when he 
decides to use force for whatever reason, the President has a unique agenda setting 
advantage over Congress at the conflict initiation stage.   Some political scientists have 
speculated that American presidents may have an incentive to create an international 
20 Fearon, supra note __ at 582; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. 
Siverson & Alastair Smith, An Institutional Explanation for the Democratic Peace, 93 AMER. POL. SCI. REV.
791, 794 (1999).  
21 As some commentators have noted, members of Congress who vote against a war risks electoral 
defeat.  See e.g., Stoll, supra note __ at 225. 
22 See JOHN MUELLER, WAR, PRESIDENTS, AND PUBLIC OPINION 48 (1973); see also John R. O’Neal 
& Anna Lillian Bryan, The Rally Round The Flag Effect In U.S. Foreign Policy Crises, 1950-1985, 17 POL.
BEHAV. 379, 393-94 (1995) (finding that although the effect was far less than previously found when one 
analyzes only independently selected international crises, the rally ‘round the flag is significantly affected by 
the media’s coverage of the crisis); Brett Ashley Leeds & David R. Davis, Domestic Political Vulnerability and 
International Disputes, 41 J CONFLICT RES. 814, 816 (1997) (“The salient and potent danger of a foreign 
adversary quells domestic dissension and increases nationalist feelings and government support.  The ‘rally 
around the flag’ effect, a tendency discovered in the United States for public approval of the president to 
increase following involvement in major international events”). 
23 See Leeds & Davis, supra note __ at 814-15 (“Actions that serve to increase national pride and 
government support and provide the executive with an opportunity to demonstrate competence… might 
help a leader survive a period in which he or she may otherwise be vulnerable”). 
24 See John Mueller, Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnston, 1970 AM. POL. SC. REV. 18, 
21. 
25 HINCKLEY, supra note __, at 79-80.  
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crisis in order to divert attention from domestic problems.26 But other commentators who 
have studied the diversionary war hypothesis have found no clear evidence between 
electoral cycles and the presidential decision to use force.27 This latter evidence makes 
sense if one assumes that the President is not able to easily transfer “rally around the flag” 
benefits to members of Congress from his own party.28 What the empirical evidence has 
shown, however, is that there is a significant correlation between the President’s 
popularity rating and the use of force.29 This result suggests that a favorable domestic 
audience may be important to the President independent of electoral cycle concerns.   As 
the political scientists Leeds & Davis argue, “Leaders who enjoy high public support are 
likely to find it easier to influence other political elites; they will have more success in 
implementing their programs as they meet with less resistance from actors within and 
outside the government.”30
The rest of this section points to two possible explanations for the President’s 
domination of the conflict escalation agenda at the beginning of a conflict: (1) the 
President’s constitutional role as the sole organ of communications in foreign affairs; and 
(2) the high public visibility and national significance of use of force issues. 
 
1.  The Sole Organ of Communications in Foreign Affairs 
The notion that the President is the sole organ of communication in foreign affairs 
is so uncontroversial that it has almost become a truism of American constitutional law.31 
The textual basis for this authority is not explicit, but courts and commentators have 
26 See Diana Richards et al., Good Times, Bad Times, and the Diversionary Use of Force, 37 J 
CONFLICT RES. 504 (1993); Patrick James and John O’Neal, The Influence of Domestic and International 
Politics on the President’s Use of Force, 35 J. CONF RES. 307 (1991); Charles Ostrom & Brian Job, The 
President and the Political Use of Force, 80 AM. POL. SC. REV. 541 (1986).  
27 See Benjamin Fordham, The Politics of Threat Perception: A Political Economy Model of US uses of 
force, 42 INT’L STUD. Q 567, 570  (1998) (“Aside from Stoll (1984), most empirical studies have found no 
significant electoral cycle in the use of force.” ) 
28 See James Campbell & Joe Sumners, Presidential Coattails in Senate Elections, 80 AM. POL. SC.
REV. 513 (1990); see also Paul Gronke, Jeffrey Koch & Matthew Wilson, Follow the Leader?  Presidential 
Approval, Presidential Support, and Representatives’ Electoral Fortunes, 65 J. POL. 785, 793 (2003). 
29 Lian Bradley & John Oneal, Presidents, the Use of Military Force, and Public Opinion, 37 J 
CONFLICT RES. 277, 378-30 (1993); see also John Mueller, Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnston, 64 
AM. POL. SC. REV. 18 (1970). 
30 Brett Leeds & David Davis, Domestic Political Vulnerability and International Disputes, 41 J CONF 
RES. 814, 817 (1997).  
 
31 See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 42 (1996) 
("That the President is the sole organ of official communication by and to the United States has not been 
questioned and has not been a source of significant controversy. Issues begin to burgeon when the President 
claims authority, as 'sole organ', to be more than an organ of communication and to determine also the 
content of the communication..."); Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the 
Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127, 1151 n.431 (2000) ("Congress has not seriously doubted that the 
President is the sole organ of communication with foreign governments."). 
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assumed that it is derived from the President’s power to appoint and receive 
ambassadors.32 Nonetheless, in the same breadth that courts and commentators often 
mention the “sole organ” role, they are quick to point out that the President does not 
have the exclusive authority to conduct foreign policy.33 There is not much analysis, 
however, as to how the President’s organ of foreign communications role influences his 
ability to shape the national security agenda. 
 
One can view the President’s role in an international crisis as that of an agent 
reacting to events that have been thrust upon him.34 Interestingly, however, his role as 
the nation’s spokesman actually puts the President in a position to create or escalate an 
international crisis.  By issuing threats against a foreign adversary, the President is able to 
create an international crisis that might eventually require a military response.35 Because 
foreign states frequently rely on the President’s statements as representing the United 
States’ position on an issue, a presidential threat also carries extra weight in creating or 
amplifying an international crisis.  In addition, the domestic audience also takes its cue as 
to the existence and nature of an international crisis from the President’s statements.  
 
The President’s agenda setting power gives him the unique ability to shape 
domestic audience preferences for the use of force abroad.  In periods of international 
crisis such as when the nation faces a foreign threat, the public tends to rally behind a 
singular authority who symbolizes national unity.36 As commander in chief, the President 
serves as a “focal point of action” and embodies a united front against what the public 
perceives is a common menace.  The public turns to him for reassurance and protection 
and they expect—indeed, they demand—that he respond by taking appropriate and 
decisive action against the perceived threat.   In these times, the public expects Congress 
to give the President the free reign to tackle the foreign menace as he sees fit.37 
The President also has the ability frame the crisis in a manner that is most likely to 
mobilize popular support for the use of force.  For instance, polls usually indicate that 
Americans are more reluctant to support the use of force if the sole military objective is to 
32 See HENKIN supra note __at 41-42. 
33 See HENKIN supra note __at 42-43 (“[I]ssues begin to burgeon when the President claims the 
authority, as sole organ, to be more than an organ of communication and also to determine the content of 
the communication”);  see also Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 961 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd, Goldwater 
v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated by 444 U.S. 996 (1979) ("While the President may be the 
sole organ of communication with foreign governments, he is clearly not the sole maker of foreign policy."). 
34 See discussion at supra notes __ 
35 See Fearon, supra note ___at 577. 
36 See Michael Fitts, The Paradox of Power in the Modern State: Why a Unitary, Centralized Presidence 
May not Exhibit Effective or Legitimate Leadership, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 827, 844 (1996) (“[T]he president can 
establish a "focal point" around preferred public policies”). 
37 See MARC E. SMYRL, CONFLICT OR CODETERMINATION?: CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND THE 
POWER TO MAKE WAR 133 (1988) (“Experience suggests that presidential military initiatives will be 
initially well received by the American public . . . Expressing strong opposition to such initiatives in their 
early stages, thus, is likely to be politically unrewarding for members of Congress.”).  
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impose political change on another country.38 In such circumstances, the risk of 
significant division of public opinion on the wisdom of the war increases, and so does the 
chance of having a protracted and expensive conflict with a significant loss of lives.39 
However, foreign policy goals that involve curbing foreign aggression or a perceived 
external threat enjoy significant popular support.40 Through his sole organ of foreign 
communications role, the President is in the unique position to frame a potential use of 
force in a manner that is most likely to galvanize public support.  Because the domestic 
audience perceives the President as having access to superior information as to the nature 
of an international crisis, it is more likely to accept the President’s position at the conflict 
initiation stage that a particular use of force is necessary to contain foreign aggression, 
even if subsequent developments call that motive into question.41 
2.  The High Public Visibility of Use of Force Issues 
In the eyes of the members of Congress, not all policies or issues are of equal 
political relevance.  Unlike the President, members of Congress are more apt to be 
politically sensitive to those issues that are most salient to their local constituencies and 
pay less attention to those of national significance.42 Beyond the explicitly parochial 
incentives that attract them to local issues, members of Congress also face acute 
collective action problems in attempting to address issues of national importance.43 
Because the potential political benefits of addressing issues of national concerns are likely 
to accrue to the institution of Congress as a whole, no one member may have an 
incentive to invest the resources to understand and claim responsibility for a national 
policy issue.  Consequently, members of Congress are likely to be unwilling to expend 
their resources and time on national issues, especially those issues that do not have a clear 
electoral payoff.  Moreover, members of Congress are particularly susceptible to issues 
that have rent-seeking opportunities—issues were the costs to the public are dispersed 
but the benefits to interest groups are concentrated.44 
38 See Bruce Jentleson, The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of 
Military Force, 36 INT’L STUD. Q.  49, 49-54 (1992). 
39 See id.  
40 See id. 
41 See John Mueller, Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnston, 64 AM. POL. SC. REV. 18, 21 
(1970) (“Invariably, the popular response to a President during international crisis is favorable, regardless of 
the policies he pursues.”) (quoting NELSON POLSBY, CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENCY 25 (1964)); see also 
CECIL V. CRABB & PAT M. HOLT, INVITATION TO STRUGGLE: CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN 
POLICY18 (1980) (“[O]nce a President has made a decision in foreign affairs that becomes known to the 
public, he automatically receives the support of at least 50 percent of the American people, irrespective of 
the nature of the decision”). 
42 See Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 132, 144-45 (1999) (observing that constituent commitments often prevent members of 
Congress from acting collectively to advance their institutional interests). 
43 See id.; see also Steve Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. 
REV. 23, 35 (1994) (arguing that Congress’s collective action problems support the argument for a unitary 
executive). 
44 See WILLIAM HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL 
ACTION 109-110 (2003). The latter phenomenon, which social scientists dub “rational ignorance,” is most 
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Unlike many rent-seeking issues, however, issues like war and foreign terrorist 
threats are not usually plagued by the problem of rational ignorance and interest group 
politics.   Indeed, the perceived costs and benefits of engaging in war or combating foreign 
terrorist threats are widely distributed.  Correspondingly, information dissemination about 
war and foreign terrorist threats in the national media is significantly high.  For instance, 
during both the 2003 and 1991 invasions of Iraq, almost all media outlets dedicated a 
significantly high amount of airtime to the conflicts, often providing live round the clock 
coverage of developments in the battlefield.45 Of course, there is no guarantee that the 
quality of information that the public receives about an international crisis is particularly 
reliable, but the relevant consideration is not necessarily the quality of the information 
but the level of public engagement with the issue.   
 
The high public visibility of war as an issue has significant implications for 
congressional willingness to assert its authority on national security issues.  It is not that 
such highly visible political issues do not provide significant electoral payoffs to members 
of Congress; they do, but the direction of the payoff is most closely related to the sway of 
public opinion.  But the President is most often in the driver’s seat when it comes to 
mobilizing public opinion in favor of initiating a war.  Thus, he is usually able to dictate 
the direction of the electoral payoff for members of Congress in an international crisis.46 
The widespread availability of war and other security issues on regular news and 
entertainment-oriented programs also tends to amplify the “rally around the flag” effect, 
mobilizing support for presidential decisions to use force.47 
B.  Uncertainty About the Use of Force Outcomes and the Scope of the Two-Level 
Interaction 
Although the President enjoys significant informational and framing advantages at 
the conflict initiation stage, the extent of that advantage starts to dissipate during the 
prevalent when the payoff to the general public from investing the resources necessary to understand an 
issue is not worth the costs.  John McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s 
Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 503 (1995) (“[P]ublic choice theory has shown that 
cohesive groups, called special interests, may be able to exercise political power out of proportion to their 
numbers to obtain resources and status for themselves . . . In contrast, since the diffuse citizenry has little 
leverage on centralized democracy, it is rationally ignorant of much government policy”); see also OLSON,
RISE AND DECLINE, supra note __, at 25-26 (discussing how typical voters are "rationally ignorant").  
45 For an account of how pervasive media coverage of war events has become see MATTHEW 
BAUM, SOFT NEWS GOES TO WAR: PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE NEW MEDIA 
AGE (2003). 
 
46As some commentators have noted, one of the most unique features of the modern plebiscitary 
president is his ability to mobilize public opinion in favor of nationally-oriented policy issues.  See Moe & 
Howell, supra note __at 145-46; Fitts, supra note __ at 890 (“[O]ne of the most important devices of a 
modern president is his ability to mobilize support through the bully pulpit -- to take advantage of his 
unitary and visible position as a ‘focal point.’”)   
47See generally MATTHEW BAUM, SOFT NEWS GOES TO WAR: PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN 
FOREIGN POLICY IN THE NEW MEDIA AGE xii (2003). 
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course of an actual conflict.  The President, like any war leader, usually has less than 
perfect information about the variables that affect the outcome of a conflict, such as the 
foreign adversary’s level of resolve and the expected costs of the conflict.48 Once a 
conflict begins in earnest, however, the President, Congress, the foreign adversary, and 
the American public can now evaluate better both the costs and objectives of the military 
engagement.  This new information by Congress and the domestic audience can alter 
significantly the President’s dominance of the crisis escalation agenda. 
 
Assume, for instance, that the American public and Congress get new 
information about the actual costs and objectives of a conflict that differs significantly 
from the original estimates given to them by the President; it is likely that their initial 
enthusiasm for the use of force will wane. This learning process is the source of the 
President’s dilemma: although he might be able to create easily a short-term rally in 
public support at the initiation of a conflict, he is unlikely to sustain that rally if there is 
military failure or stalemate.  Thus, a President who is thinking of initiating an 
international crisis needs to consider not only the positive domestic audience reaction at 
the early stages of a conflict but also the likelihood of a domestic backlash if the war goes 
wrong.   In many respects, this uncertainty about the outcome of foreign military 
engagements has many ramifications for the President’s decision as to whether to seek 
congressional authorization before going to war.  
 
First, a point of clarification: as used here, military failure does not necessarily 
entail the outright defeat of the United States by a foreign adversary.  Indeed, given the 
significant military and resource advantage that the United States has over almost every 
other country, the risk of outright defeat of the United States in a foreign military 
engagement is relatively trivial.   Rather the notion of military failure or success as used 
here depends on three factors: costs (both in human lives and resources), time, and the 
nature of the military objectives.  All else equal, the American public will likely perceive a 
military campaign as a failure if: (1) the conflict is protracted and results in high human 
casualties; and (2) the primary objective of the war does not involve curbing foreign 
aggression.49 Thus, if one were to develop a typology of United States military outcomes, 
at one end of the spectrum representing classic military success would be a swift and 
relatively costless effort to restrain foreign aggression.  At the other end of the spectrum 
representing classic military failure would be a protracted and costly effort to impose 
political change on a foreign country.  In the middle (ranging from success to failure) 
would be a swift and non-costly effort in a mixed-motives war (both curbing foreign 
aggression and internal political change), a protracted and costly effort to curb foreign 
aggression, a swift and quick effort to achieve internal political change only, and a 
protracted and costly mixed-motives war. 
48 See Fearon, supra note __ at 583. 
49 In the latter case, the empirical evidence shows that the American public is generally more 
supportive of using force to restrain a country from aggression than using force to impose political change in 
another country.  See Bruce Jentleson, The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the 
Use of Force, 36 INT’L STUD. Q 49 (1992).  
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TABLE 1
A Spectrum of Possible Outcomes in American Foreign Military Engagements 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Success       Failure 
 
Swift and non-costly war curbing foreign aggression>Swift and non-costly war 
involving mixed motives (both curbing foreign aggression and imposing political 
change)>Protracted and costly war curbing foreign aggression>Swift and non-
costly war imposing internal political change only>Protracted and costly war 
involving mixed motives (both curbing foreign aggression and imposing political 
change)>Protracted and costly war imposing internal political change only. 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Where the outcome of a military conflict is likely to fit within the spectrum  
makes a difference as to whether the President will decide to seek congressional 
authorization.  As explained in the next two sections, the President’s ex ante belief that a 
conflict is likely to fit towards the failure end of the spectrum increases the likelihood that 
he will seek congressional authorization before going to war.      
 
1. The Domestic Level: Buying Political Insurance in Wars with Uncertain 
Outcomes 
Introducing a certain degree of uncertainty about the outcome of a military 
engagement can radically change the separation of powers landscape.  Since neither 
Congress nor the President is likely to know with complete certainty the outcome of any 
war in advance, they are likely to position themselves to exploit any political 
opportunities that become available as they gain more information about the probable 
outcome of the war.  Just as presidents may find it useful to exploit their institutional 
advantage at the conflict initiation stage to mobilize political support for their agenda, 
there are also opposition politicians in Congress who are willing to exploit the President’s 
military failure to mobilize political opposition to his agenda.50 When the war goes well, 
these opposition figures in Congress may be content to bask in the President’s glory, but 
when things wrong they are likely to sing a different tune.    
 
50 See Todd Allee & Paul Huth, Domestic Political Accountability and the Escalation and Settlement of 
International Disputes, 46 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RES. 754, 758 (2002) (“The strategic behavior of political 
opposition:  In all political systems, there are political elites who seek to remove the current leadership and 
assume positions of political power themselves.”) 
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Because of the downside political risks associated with military failure, the 
President often has to factor in his ex-ante beliefs about the likely outcome of a conflict in 
deciding whether to seek congressional authorization.  Although he may be able to 
initiate conflict on his own without much opposition from Congress, the incentives of 
members of Congress (especially those in the opposition) are likely to change as the war 
progresses and casualties mount.  This consideration leads to our first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: In circumstances where the President is uncertain about the 
prospects of rapid military success, he is likely to resort to congressional 
authorization in order to spread the political costs of decision-making among 
other domestic political actors.   
 
In this hypothesis, the proxy for whether the President is uncertain about the 
prospects of immediate military success involves the scale and the announced period of 
the deployment.  All else equal, if the President announces a significant military 
deployment (let us say over 20,000 troops) for a significant period of time (longer than 3 
months), he is likely signaling a “high risk” military engagement. 
 
The President’s decision to seek congressional authorization as a form of political 
insurance is in large part driven by two considerations regarding the potential political 
costs of a failed military engagement.  First, when a President mobilizes the domestic 
audience in an international crisis, he not only “locks in” Congress to a specific military 
response, he also “locks in” himself.51 Therefore, the President usually does not have 
much political flexibility in backing out of a military engagement after he has initiated it 
even if he subsequently revises his beliefs about the likely outcome.   Second, the 
domestic audience costs for a failed military engagement without congressional 
authorization may be subject to a cascading effect.  In other words, the more unpopular 
the prosecution of a failed military engagement, the greater the chance of increased 
congressional resistance, and in turn the greater the likelihood that the President will lack 
the political momentum to withstand such congressional resistance.  Moreover, 
opposition members of Congress will be poised not only to blame the President for 
military failure, but also for embarking on a military campaign in the first place without 
congressional authorization.  
 
At first blush, the President’s calculus of whether to go alone seems rather 
straightforward:  If the war goes well, he gains considerable political momentum for his 
political agenda without having to share the political spoils of victory; if it goes bad, he 
provides easy and potentially devastating ammunition to his political opponents.   
Therefore, absent the seemingly vain impulse of a president who desires to take exclusive 
credit for military victories, we would ordinarily expect the President to seek 
51 See James Fearon, Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs, 41 J. 
CONFLICT RES. 68, 70 (1997) (“Tying hands signals typically works by creating audience costs that the 
leadership would suffer due to the reaction of domestic political audiences to a perceived failure in the 
management of foreign policy”).  
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congressional approval for all uses of force.  But the President’s decision-making process is 
not likely to be that simple.  A president who seeks legislative consent before going to war 
may face other significant risks such as the legislative imposition of burdensome 
substantive and procedural restraints on how the actual war is conducted, premature 
disclosure of secret or confidential military plans by members of Congress, and the 
possibility of outright rejection of his request by Congress.52 
The President’s dilemma is not as bad as it seems, however.   Although the 
President and Congress may both face uncertainty about the likely outcome of a military 
engagement, the level of uncertainty is hardly symmetrical.  In other words, the President 
is almost always likely to possess better information about the likely outcome of a military 
engagement than members of Congress.53 Given this informational asymmetry, the 
President can at the outset present evidence about the factors that affect the outcome of 
the war, such as motive and costs, in a manner that is most likely to win congressional 
support.  The President may thus often get the kind of congressional authorization he 
wants for military engagements without too many strings attached.  
 
Of course, in selling the war, the President may have an incentive to exaggerate 
(or understate) his beliefs about the expected costs and objectives of the war.  As the war 
progresses and members of Congress learn about the true costs or objectives of the 
conflict, however, they can revise their judgments about the political benefits/costs of 
supporting the President and try to position themselves accordingly.  Indeed, risk-averse 
members of Congress may actually prefer that the President go solo without consulting 
them because it gives them the flexibility to jump on the rally around the flag bandwagon 
if things go well, or to sharpen their swords and distance themselves politically from the 
President if things go badly.   
 
In any event, notwithstanding the President’s informational advantages, his 
decision to seek congressional authority before going to war is not costless.  Indeed, in 
many circumstances, he may seek to obtain the reassurance that congressional approval is 
clearly forthcoming before he formally seeks congressional consent.54 In other 
circumstances, he may believe that the chance of military success is high enough that he 
does not need the kind of political insurance that congressional authorization affords.  
This consideration leads to the second hypothesis: 
 
52 See James Lindsay & Randall Ripley, How Congress Influences Foreign and Defense Policy, in 
CONGRESS RESURGENT: FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY ON CAPITOL HILL 17-35(Ripley & Lindsay, Ed. 
2004); Louis Fisher, Congressional Checks on Military Initiatives, 109 POL. SC. Q. 739, 757 (1994). 
53 Terry Moe & William Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, supra note __ at 132; 
see also HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION, supra note __ at 102-03. 
54 See John Zaller, Strategic Politicians, Public Opinion, and the Gulf Crisis, in TAKEN BY STORM: THE 
MEDIA, PUBLIC OPINION, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE GULF WAR  266 (Lance Bennett & David 
Paletz, Eds. 1994) (“Bush made the request [for congressional approval only after . . . he was almost certain 
to receive Congressional endorsement”).  
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Hypothesis 2: The President is likely to go to war without congressional 
authorization when the expected costs of a war are low and the likelihood 
of victory is high. 
 
This second hypothesis is obviously the corollary to the first one discussed above.  
Congressional authorization provides a form of political insurance for the President in 
which he alone does not get to bear the possible downside costs of military failure.  In 
situations where the President is fairly sure of rapid military success, however, such as 
when the foreign adversary is known to lack either the resources or resolve to prosecute a 
war against the United States, he will not need the protection of political insurance.  In 
such circumstances, the President is likely to prefer complete agenda control over the 
prosecution of the war, knowing that when the war is terminated on his terms he is surely 
going to reap the benefit of a positive domestic audience reaction.  From the President’s 
perspective, congressional input in such “little wars” can be counterproductive because it 
is likely to decrease the likelihood of immediate victory.   In other words, without the 
element of surprise that unilateral action affords, the President will be constrained in his 
ability to develop a military strategy that minimizes the loss of casualties in little wars.  
 
If the downside risks of possible military failure or stalemate are significant enough 
even with the element of surprise, however, the President will likely forego the benefit 
that unilateral action provides.  Indeed, the element of surprise may actually be 
counterproductive in high stakes military engagements because the domestic audience 
may not necessarily be prepared for the significant casualties or loss of lives that such 
engagements entail.   In such high stakes conflicts, the President will likely choose to 
escalate the crisis gradually in order to condition the American public and Congress to 
the possibility of significant war casualties and financial commitments.  Moreover, a 
gradual escalation strategy gives the President the opportunity to observe and measure 
the level of public support for war before he crosses a critical threshold where backing out 
of the use of force is not a politically feasible option.  
 
While the foregoing discussion focuses primarily on the President’s incentives to 
seek congressional authorization, the factors involved in a high stakes military 
engagement also affect congressional willingness to constrain the President.  At the 
conflict initiation stage, the President usually has the ability to influence the domestic 
audience costs in a manner that makes congressional approval of his war agenda likely.   
However, if the President is already involved in a costly military engagement, or has 
recently just concluded a failed military engagement, the public appetite for the use of 
force is likely to diminish.  In such situations, members of Congress have an incentive to 
capitalize on the shift in public opinion and oppose the President’s agenda.  This 
consideration leads to the third hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 3: Congress will most likely act to constrain the President’s war-
making agenda in the shadow of a recent politically unpopular use of force. 
 
In this context, the shadow of recent uses of force refers not only to  
recently concluded wars but also the escalation of ongoing wars.  All else equal, the 
domestic audience will generally disfavor involvement in foreign military engagements in 
the period following a war with significant casualties.55 In these situations, members of 
Congress, especially those in opposition, will likely take advantage of the unpopularity of 
the war to constrain the presidential use of force.56 Of course, members of Congress may 
not have the ability to curb directly the presidential deployment of troops, but they can 
make the presidential exercise of the use of force much more costly by cutting off funds, 
by invoking statutory consulting and reporting requirements, or by threatening the 
President with impeachment.57 
The most obvious institutional device at Congress’s disposal for constraining the 
presidential use of force is the War Powers Resolution (“WPR”).58 Passed in 1973 over 
President Nixon’s veto, the WPR provides certain procedures that the President has to 
comply with before he introduces forces into foreign hostilities.   Ever since its passage, 
legal commentators of various stripes have dismissed the WPR as a toothless piece of 
legislation.59 These critics focus on what seems to be a severe loophole in the reporting 
requirements of section 4.60 More specifically, they usually point out that since only 
section 4(a)(1) triggers the time limit in section 5(b), which requires the termination of 
hostilities after sixty to ninety days,61 the termination requirements of section 5(b) can be 
easily evaded.62 In other words, a president who wants to evade section 5(b)’s time limits 
can simply report that a deployment falls under sections 4(a)(2) or 4(a)(3), which do not 
have automatic termination requirements, rather than section 4(a)(1).  Indeed, of the 
over 110 uses of force that have been reported under section 4 since the WPR was 
enacted, only once has section 4(a)(1) been cited—by President Ford in the 1975 seizure 
55See Charles Ostrom & Brian Job, The President and the Political Use of Force, 80 AM. POL. SC.
REV. 541, 548 (1986) (“The greater involvement in a ‘shooting war, the longer will be the period following 
the war in which the public will resist any further or additional involvement that might lead to U.S. 
casualties.”). 
56 See MARC SMRYL, CONFLICT OR CODETERMINATION 137 (1988) (When U.S. involvement ….. 
continues, the likelihood of Congressional action can increase if public opposition to military action 
develops”).  
57 See generally James Lindsay & Randall Ripley, How Congress Influences Foreign and Defense Policy,
in CONGRESS RESURGENT: FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY ON CAPITOL HILL 17-35(Ripley & Lindsay, Ed. 
2004).   
58 87 Stat. 555 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548).  
59 HINCKLEY, supra note __ at 99-100; KOH, supra note __ at 39-40; 128; LOUIS FISHER,
PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 132 (1995); MICHAEL GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 103-07 
(1990). 
60 See 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a). 
61See  50 U.S.C. § 1544(b). 
62 See KOH, supra note ___at 126-127; ELY, supra note ___ at 49 (describing “pattern of 
presidential evasion”). 
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of the SS Mayaguez.63 Thus, as a practical matter, Congress may often have to build a 
veto-proof majority to force the President to terminate a use of force.   The critics of the 
WPR argue that this loophole transforms the WPR into a symbolic statute that does little 
to enhance Congress’s war powers authority.64
Contrary to the received wisdom, this Article argues that the WPR is actually an 
ingenious statutory instrument that enables members of Congress to monitor the political 
pulse of a war and intervene strategically.  While the critics are probably correct that the 
WPR has not proven to be a very effective instrument for enhancing Congress’s overall 
institutional prerogative, it has proven much more effective in giving members of 
Congress the opportunity to harness the political benefits of the use of force without 
bearing much of the downside costs.  More specifically, the WPR allows members of 
Congress to remain agnostic and not invoke its provisions if the public momentum seems 
to favor the presidential use of force, but then invoke it selectively otherwise.   Thus, the 
WPR can act conveniently as a sword when a war turns ugly and there are political 
benefits for constraining presidential authority, and act as a shield at other times when 
intervention might seem politically imprudent. 
 
Furthermore, the ability of Congress to invoke the WPR selectively increases the 
President’s political insurance costs.  In other words, if the President refuses to seek 
congressional approval for a use of force that subsequently becomes unpopular, members 
of Congress can capitalize on the President’s misfortunes by pointing out that he 
deliberately ignored a statutory scheme that was already in place.  Thus, all else equal, the 
President has a greater incentive to seek congressional authorization for the use of force 
given the existence of the WPR than he would otherwise. 
 
From an electoral perspective, the WPR’s reporting, consulting, and constraining 
provisions serve a variety of important purposes.  Section 4’s reporting requirements 
compel the President to disclose any information about all uses of force, which includes 
uses of force that might otherwise be conducted surreptitiously.65 By making such actions 
public, Congress has an opportunity to gauge the public response to the use of force and 
decide whether congressional intervention would be politically desirable.  Moreover, the 
termination requirements under section 5(c) also give Congress a ready-made statutory 
framework to repudiate the President’s use of force decision when it becomes politically 
desirable to do so.   Although Congress could in theory repudiate the President’s use of 
force without such a provision, such as by threatening to cut-off funds, the very existence 
of section 5(c) is likely to influence the President’s calculus of whether to ignore or 
accommodate congressional preferences in the first instance.  As one commentator has 
noted, “even if the [WPR] clock does not tick on the sixty to ninety day deadline, 
63See HINCKLEY, supra note ___ at 86. 
64 See KOH, supra note __at 126-127; ELY, supra note __ at 49 (concluding that the War Powers 
Resolution “has not worked” due to loopholes and Congress’ unwillingness to close them). 
65 See David Auerswald & Peter Cowhey, Ballotbox Diplomacy: The War Powers Resolution and the 
Use of Force, 41 INT’L STUD. Q. 505, 509 (1997).   
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executive officials behave as though it does.”66 In other words, although presidents tend 
to routinely disclaim the applicability of the WPR, they nonetheless seem to be wary of 
ignoring its provisions.  
 
One significant caveat:  in deciding whether to constrain the presidential use of 
force, different members of Congress face varying incentives.  Members of the President’s 
party may have an incentive to support the Presidential use of force even in the face of 
waning public support since the President’s electoral fortunes may be closely tied to their 
own.  Opposition members of Congress, on the other hand, have an incentive to support 
the President only when there are “rally around the flag” benefits associated with the use 
of force.67 Given these varying incentives, we might expect congressional resistance to 
the President’s agenda to increase when the opposition is the majority party in Congress.  
Some political scientists have actually documented a relationship between the partisan 
composition of Congress and legislative resistance to the use of force.68 These findings 
support the thesis in this Article that congressional resistance to the use of force is likely 
to increase if there are clear electoral payoffs for doing so.  The focus of this paper, 
however, is not on the political motivations that drive individual members of Congress, 
but the factors that affect the institutional capacity of Congress to constrain the 
President.  Thus, while this Article does not factor in the partisan composition of 
Congress in its analysis, it acknowledges that during a politically unpopular war the 
opposition members may have a greater incentive to constrain the President’s political 
agenda.  
 
Hypothesis 4: While the President is more likely to be shaping public opinion in his 
commander-in-chief role, Congress is more likely to be responding to public 
opinion when it constrains the President’s national security agenda. 
 
As some scholars of the institutional presidency have noted, the President has the 
unique ability to make the first move on a policy issue and then wait for the other 
branches of government to respond.69 In the war powers context, the President’s first 
move advantage is most clearly demonstrated when he uses his role as the commander-in-
chief to create or escalate an international crisis without having to first convince the 
other institutional actors of the wisdom of his action.  While Congress and the courts may 
occasionally respond to the President’s use of force decisions, it is rare that any of these 
other branches of government actually take a proactive stance in national security 
issues.70 
66 LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 133 (1995). 
67 See Kenneth Schultz, Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises, 92 AM. POL. SC.
REV. 829, 831 (1998) (pointing to empirical evidence that suggests that it will be costly for opposition 
parties to oppose wars that voters consider successful).  
68 See Meernik, Congress, the President, and the Commitment of the U.S. Military, supra note __ at 
384. 
69 See HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION, supra note __ at 14. 
70 Koh, supra note  at__ . 
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Of course, when the President makes the first move on a policy decision such as 
the use of force, he is not necessarily waiting for a reaction from Congress.  It is more 
appropriate to describe the President’s first move advantage in national security issues as 
his ability to shape favorable public opinion for his preferred military course of action. 71 
Correspondingly, it is more appropriate to consider a congressional response to the 
President’s decision as a response to the public’s perception of that decision.  Thus, in 
many circumstances preceding the actual initiation of a conflict, the President will be able 
to mobilize public opinion in his favor and on those occasions Congress will usually 
rubberstamp the President’s decision.72 In other circumstances, such as when casualties 
and the costs of the war become fairly significant, the public is likely to turn against the 
President and members of Congress are likely to follow suit.73
The ability to frame and influence public opinion on use of force issues thus 
distinguishes presidential action from congressional intervention.  In other words, from 
the perspective of the domestic audience, the President is proactive and Congress is 
reactive on national security issues.   
 
Concluding that Congress follows public opinion on national security issues does 
not resolve the question of causality, however.  If, for instance, the President withdraws 
from a politically unpopular use of force decision, how would we know whether he is 
reacting to congressional intervention or to the negative reaction of a domestic audience? 
Or put differently, if the President is simply reacting to negative public opinion, how can 
one claim that Congress is actively constraining the President’s national security agenda? 
 
The answer is that President has very little incentive to react directly to a negative 
domestic audience in use of force decisions.  Indeed, it will often be to the President’s 
disadvantage to withdraw or pull out of a military engagement in the midst of declining public 
support because he will look incompetent if he does so.74 In other words, instead of rewarding 
the President for withdrawing from a politically unpopular use of force, the domestic audience 
is more likely to punish him for initiating a military engagement he could not win.75 In this 
sense, the same sort of domestic audience factors that make it difficult for the President to 
back out of an escalating international crisis are also likely going to make it difficult for him 
to back out of a politically unpopular conflict.  Thus, rather than withdraw as a military 
71 See Robert Shapiro & Lawrence Jacobs, Lyndon Johnson, Vietnam, and Public Opinion: Rethinking 
Realist Theory of Leadership, 29 PRES. STUD. Q 592 (1999) (observing that President Johnson led and 
directed public opinion on the Vietnam war).   
72 HINCKLEY, supra note __ at 80. 
73 See Timothy Cotton, War and American Democracy: Electoral Costs of the Last Five Wars, 30 J 
CONFLICT RES. 616, 619-20 (1986).  
74 See Fearon, Domestic Political Audience, supra note __ at 581.  
75 See Huth & Allee, Domestic Political Accountability, supra note __ at 759 (“Opposition elites and 
mass publics . . .  do not generally hold more dovish diplomatic and military preferences than incumbent 
leaders.  Instead, they simply seek to punish leaders who adopt controversial or failed policies.”).  
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campaign becomes unpopular, the President has an incentive to escalate the conflict and 
hope for strategic victories in the battlefield that will change the wind of public opinion.76 
Of course, the President’s preference may not necessarily be to entrench the 
troops in a war at all costs; he may on occasion prefer to pull out of an intractable military 
engagement if he concludes that the war is unwinnable and that he is likely to face some 
punishment by a domestic audience regardless of the eventual outcome of the military 
engagement.77 Under such circumstances, the President may choose to terminate the 
military engagement but will likely try to do so in a manner that minimizes the political 
fallout from pulling out.  For instance, he may insist on settlement terms that suggest that 
the United States fulfilled some of its military objectives.   Alternatively, he may revise his 
military objectives and present the withdrawal as a victory to the domestic audience by 
arguing that some of the “revised” military objectives had been met and that further 
engagement with the foreign adversary would either be unnecessary or counterproductive.  
In all these circumstances, however, the President is likely to consider withdrawal only as 
a last resort because it is likely to result in some form of domestic audience costs.78 Thus, 
the President’s initial preference will be to gamble that the course of the war will change 
in a favorable direction rather than admit defeat at the first signs of a negative domestic 
reaction.  
 
Unlike the President, members of Congress, especially those in the opposition, do not  
necessarily have an incentive to support the President’s use of force decision once public support for 
the war declines significantly.  On the contrary, whenever opposition members in Congress perceive 
that public opinion has turned against the war they have an incentive to mobilize immediately 
against the President’s national security agenda.   
 
These varying incentives between the President and members of Congress on the 
question of the termination of war are rooted in the asymmetric political payoffs they face 
in use of force issues.  In other words, the President faces a different political payoff than 
members of Congress when he decides to engage in a war even if the war has been 
approved by Congress.79 When there is a rally around the flag effect, the President is 
76 As former Secretary of State George Ball aptly put it:  “Once we suffer large casualties, we will 
have started a well-nigh irreversible process.  Our involvement will be so great that we cannot—without 
national humiliation---stop short of achieving our goals.”  (quoted in George Downs & David Rocke, 
Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection:  The Principal Agent Problem Goes to War, 38 Am. J. Pol. Sc. 
362, 375 (1994).  Downs and Rocke characterize the practice as “gambling for resurrection.” Id. at 374.   
77 Indeed, in certain circumstances, the President may conclude that domestic audience costs are 
likely to increase in the absence of an immediate withdrawal.  See HEIN GOEMANS, WAR AND PUNISHMENT 
39-40 (2003). 
78 Political scientists who have studied democratic regimes and war have observed that democratic 
leaders are usually reluctant to initiate international crisis unless they are assured of winning.  See Bruce 
Bueno de Mesquita et al., An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace, 93 AMER. POL. SC. REV. 791, 
802 (1999).  
79 See Fitts, The Paradox of Power, supra note __  at 888 (observing that the public is more likely to 
hold the President than Congress responsible for national events because of public perceptions that 
Congress faces a collective action problem).  
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likely to benefit from the rally effect more than members of Congress.  Correspondingly, if 
there is domestic backlash against the use of force, the President is more likely to be 
blamed than members of Congress.80 Since the President bears a disproportionate burden 
of the costs of military failure, the opposition members of Congress might prefer to 
terminate a conflict early even if they suffer some domestic audience costs since they 
know the President is likely to suffer even higher costs. 81 
2.  The International Level: Sending Costly Signals to Foreign Adversaries 
In some circumstances, the presidential choice to seek congressional approval for 
the use of force may be a strategic signal to the foreign adversary about the United States’ 
willingness to prosecute a conflict.  Costly signals play a very important role in use of force 
situations especially when both states are mutually uncertain about each other’s cost 
tolerance for prosecuting the conflict.82 By undertaking the costly effort to seek 
authorization from Congress—an institution that includes members who have an 
incentive to oppose the President’s policy—the President sends a more credible signal of 
United States’ resolve to prosecute the conflict.83 
Costly signals to a foreign adversary are especially important for democratic 
regimes.  Assume, for instance, that the foreign adversary is uncertain about the United 
States’ cost tolerance for escalating a specific conflict.   The foreign adversary may 
nonetheless conclude that because the United States is a democratic regime, there is 
likely to be an opposition party that competes with the President for political power.  
Absent the support of such an opposition, the foreign adversary may reckon that the cost 
tolerance of the United States for military casualties is likely to be low because the 
opposition stands to reap political benefits from military failure by the President.84 On the 
other hand, support by the domestic political opposition for the president’s use of force 
decision sends a credible signal to the foreign adversary because “while the government 
[in power] may have incentives to bluff (about the United States’ resolve), the opposition 
has no incentive to collude in the bluff.”85 
80 See id.  
81 See ELY, supra note __at 53 (“[D]espite the Tonkin Gulf Resolution most members of Congress 
felt no compunction whatever about disclaiming responsibility for the war and blaming it entirely on the 
President.”) 
82 See Fearon, Domestic Political Audiences, supra note __ at 582.  
83 Some commentators have noted that the President will seeks legislative ratification of treaties as 
a costly signal to foreign treaty partners of the United States’ commitment to its treaty obligations.  See, e.g., 
John Setear, The President’s Rational Choice of a Treaty’s Preratification Pathway:  Article II, Congressional-
Executive Agreement, or Executive Agreement?, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 5 (2002). 
84 See Paul Huth & Todd Allee, Domestic Political Accountability, supra note __ at 759.  
85 Kenneth Schultz, Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises, 92 AMER. POL. SC.
REV. 829, 838 (1998). In 1986, Caspar Weinberger, then Secretary of Defense wrote that legislative 
participation and public support were crucial in signaling United States resolve: 
 
Before the United States commits combat forces abroad, the U.S. government should 
have some reasonable assurance of the American people and their elected representatives in 
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Sending a costly signal to the foreign adversary may only be important to the 
President when he believes that the foreign adversary has significant military capabilities 
or a high level of resolve.  In other words, the more the President believes that an 
immediate victory is likely with a non-costly show of force, the less the value of the costly 
signal.   As mentioned earlier, a President who seeks congressional authorization for the 
use of force risks the possibility of outright rejection of his national security agenda.86 
Thus, in the context of “little wars” where the prospects of immediate victory are high, 
the President is more likely to dispense with the role of congressional authorization as a 
costly signal.87 This last consideration leads up to our final hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Where the President is uncertain about the military capabilities and 
the level of resolve of a foreign adversary, he is likely to resort to congressional 
authorization to send a costly signal to the foreign adversary of United States’ 
resolve to prosecute the conflict. 
 
The problem with the hypothesis above is that it involves a variable—the value of 
costly signaling—which is interdependent with the political insurance variable discussed 
in the first hypothesis.  Often, the presidential decision to seek domestic political 
insurance through congressional authorization will also implicate the presidential need to 
send a costly signal to the foreign adversary.  For instance, when the President seeks 
congressional approval as a form of political insurance because he is worried about the 
prospects of military failure, he may also conclude that the lack of congressional 
authorization is likely to increase the chance for military failure.  Thus, the President’s 
desire to signal resolve to the foreign enemy is likely to overlap with his desire to seek 
political insurance through congressional authorization.  
 
Because the President is likely to anticipate congressional reaction when he 
decides whether he wants to send a signal to the foreign adversary, it will often be very 
difficult to isolate the causal variables in any particular presidential decision to seek 
congressional authorization.  Although the historical evidence in some of the case studies 
suggest that both variables are at play, the issue of falsifiability looms large.  Therefore, for 
the skeptic, is may be difficult to test the theoretical framework espoused here against the 
alternatives.   Even with these limitations, however, the following case studies probably 
provide the best method for evaluating the strength of the theoretical model.  Through 
the various speeches, floor amendments, newspaper reports and executive edicts referred 
Congress. . . . The public elects the President as a leader, not a follower.  He takes an oath to 
protect and defend the Constitution.  The people also expect a Congress sworn to the same 
principles and duties.  To that end, the president and leadership of the Congress must build the 
public consensus necessary to protect our vital interests.    
 
Caspar Weinberger, U.S. Defense Strategy, 65 Foreign Affairs 675, 686 (1986). 
 
86 See discussion at supra notes __ 
87 See discussion at supra notes __ 
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to in these case studies, we are given a window into some of the thought processes of the 
institutional actors that drive the use of force decisions.   
 
II.  THE CASE STUDIES OF PRESIDENTIAL-CONGRESSIONAL INTERACTION ON 
WAR-POWERS 
This Part of the Article examines 4 different modern case studies of 
presidential-executive interaction on the use of force: (1) President Reagan’s 1982-1983 
deployment of Marines in Lebanon; (2) President Reagan’s 1983 invasion of the 
Caribbean island of Grenada; (3) President Clinton’s 1993 effort to provide humanitarian 
relief after a state-breakdown in Somalia (“Operation Restore Hope”); and (4) President 
Bush’s 2003 invasion of Iraq.88 The final section of this Part reviews cases that do not 
seem to fit the political insurance model.  
 
These case studies reveal that presidents are more likely to seek congressional 
authorization in use of force situations that require extensive troop deployments (greater 
than 20,000 ground troops) over a long period of time (longer than three months).  Such 
extended troop deployments are effective proxies for the president’s belief that the war is 
likely to involve a significant risk of casualties or military stalemate.   Moreover, Congress 
is more likely to intervene in two separate circumstances: (1) in protracted wars where 
there is declining public support; (2) in the shadow of a recent unpopular use of force.   
For instance, the protracted deployment of U.S. Marines in Lebanon came under a lot of 
congressional fire after an unpopular response to the October 1983 barracks bombing that 
killed 239 servicemen.89 
Beyond the case studies examined in detail below, presidents have shown in other 
circumstances that they are willing to commit United States Forces to military 
engagements without congressional authorization when the immediate prospects of 
victory are high.  Other instances of unilateral use of force by the President in low-risk 
conflicts in the post-Vietnam era include: the 1975 rescue mission on the U.S. merchant 
ship Mayaguez, the 1980 Iran rescue mission, the 1986 air strikes against Libya, the 1989 
invasion of Panama, the 1987 escort operations in the Persian Gulf, the 1993 air strikes 
against Iraq for attempting to assassinate President Bush, the 1993 air strikes in Bosnia, 
the 1998 air strikes against terrorist sites in Sudan and Afghanistan; and the 1999 air 
strikes during the Kosovo intervention.  
 
88 For the methodological approach I used to generate the public opinion polls and graphs in these 
case studies, I simply gathered public opinion data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research over 
the relevant periods for the wars used in the case studies.  This data is available on Roper’s website at 
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/. To determine whether opinion polls changed over time, I recalculated 
the poll responses to eliminate don’t know, not sure, and no opinion responses.  See BENJAMIN PAGE &
ROBERT SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC: FIFTY YEARS OF TRENDS IN AMERICANS' POLICY PREFERENCES 
44-53 (1992) (adopting similar conventions to test change of American public opinion over time).  
89 See discussion infra notes __ 
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Although the focus of these cases studies is on post-Vietnam uses of force, the 
Vietnam conflict itself is also a very good illustration how presidential interaction with 
the domestic audience can shape the division of war-powers authority.  For instance, in 
the tense and uncertain atmosphere following the Tonkin Gulf incidents, President 
Johnson was able to frame the issue as an act of foreign aggression that required an 
immediate and decisive military response.90 Moreover, President Johnson’s strategy of 
escalating the conflict whenever there was a sustained dip in the public opinion polls also 
supports the gamble for revival hypothesis.91 In other words, instead of following 
negative public opinion polls when the war was going badly, President Johnson tried to 
change the course of public opinion by escalating the war with the hope of achieving 
strategic battlefield victories.   
 
A. The 1982-1984 Intervention in Lebanon and the 1983 Intervention in    
 Grenada 
 
In many ways, the interventions in Lebanon in 1982-1984 and the intervention  
in Grenada in 1983 are inextricably linked from the perspective of domestic audience 
costs.  The Grenada invasion was commenced two days after the most tragic moment of 
the Lebanon intervention: the October 23, 1983 terrorist bombing of the U.S. Marine 
barracks in Beirut that left over 269 Marines dead and dozens injured.92 The eventual 
success of the Grenada invasion managed to divert public attention from the tragedy 
unfolding in Beirut.  More importantly, the significant public support for the relatively 
rapid Grenada invasion most likely muted growing public distaste for the American 
military role in Lebanon.  When the euphoria of the Grenada invasion wore off, however, 
public dissatisfaction with the Lebanese intervention increased and Congress continued 
to mount resistance to the President’s Middle-East policies.  As discussed in more detail 
below, such congressional resistance proved to be crucial in the President’s decision to 
order the withdrawal of the Marines from Lebanon in March 31, 1984.  In any event, 
given the complex relationship between the public reactions to the Grenada and Lebanon 
interventions, it is hard to analyze these two conflicts in isolation from one another.  
Thus, the following two case studies will often discuss both conflicts when necessary to 
understand the context of the domestic audience’s reactions to these conflicts. 
 
1. Lebanon.  In 1982 Lebanon was a country wracked by civil war with  
over six warring factions occupying different parts of the country.  The United States 
intervention in that country in 1982 would consist of two separate deployments.   The 
90 See ELY, supra note __ at 20-21 (suggesting that the Johnson administration misled Congress in 
reporting the Tonkin Gulf incidents). 
91 As Jacobs and Shapiro demonstrate, President Johnson’s administration focused its efforts on 
shaping public opinion for the war and not following it.  See Robert Shapiro & Lawrence Jacobs, Lyndon 
Johnson, Vietnam, and Public Opinion: Rethinking Realist Theory of Leadership, 29 PRES. STUDIES Q. 592, 594 
(1999).  More interestingly, their empirical analysis reveals that during the period when public opinion polls 
supporting the withdrawal of troops actually increased, President Johnson’s “militaristic statements and 
decisions to increase bombing and troops levels also continued to increase.” Id. at 607. 
92 Steven Strasser, The Marine Massacre, NEWSWEEK, 31 Oct. 1983. 
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first deployment, which lasted less than a month, occurred in August 1982 and involved 
overseeing the withdrawal of PLO forces from Lebanon.93 The second deployment, which 
occurred in late September that year, involved a multinational effort to restore order after 
Christian Phalangist militiamen massacred 460 people in two Palestinian refugee camps 
ostensibly in retaliation for the assassination of Lebanese President Amin Gemayal.94 
Initially, President Reagan did not seek congressional authorization for either of these 
deployments.95 In both instances, the number of troops initially deployed was relatively 
small—less than 1,200 troops and the administration insisted the troops would be out by 
the end of the year.  By late that year, however, the situation in Lebanon had worsened 
and the Christian-led government of Amin Gemayal had asked the countries contributing 
to the multinational force to increase their presence.96 When President Reagan 
announced in December 1982 that he would seriously consider the Lebanese 
government’s request to double the Marine presence in Lebanon, some members of 
Congress started requesting formal reassurances from the administration regarding the 
scope of the U.S. military role in Lebanon.97 
Although there were occasional congressional requests to President Reagan 
regarding the role of the Marines in Lebanon, Congress did not play any formal role in the 
Lebanese intervention until mid-year 1983.  The congressional intervention was triggered 
in part by a bomb that exploded at the U.S. embassy in Beirut on April 18, 1983 that 
killed 61 people.98 The day after the bombing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
passed a bill that approved $250 million for military and economic aid to Lebanon but the 
bill was contingent on the President seeking congressional approval for any expansion of 
the U.S. military role in Lebanon.99 Eventually, President Reagan signed the resulting 
legislation--the Lebanese Emergency Assistance Act of 1983 (the “LEAA”).100 Although 
the LEAA explicitly required that the President seek congressional authority for any 
future expansion of the mission in Lebanese, it did not in any way suggest that the WPR 
was triggered by the events in Lebanon or that the duration of the deployment was 
contingent on congressional authorization. 
 
By late August, events in Lebanon started to look bleak.  On August 29, Druse 
militia forces attacked a contingent of U.S. military forces in West Beirut and killed two 
Marines.101 The President reported these casualties to certain congressional leaders but 
93 Richard Whittle, Report on Marines Skirts War Powers Issues, 1982 Cong. Q. 2157, 2158 
94 Richard Whittle, Congress Uncertain about Aid to Isreal, 1982 Cong. Q. 2357, 2357/ 
95 John Felton, Some in Congress Uneasy About New Role for Marines in Lebanon Peace Force, 1982 
Cong. Q. 2469 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 2469.  
98 DANIEL P. BOLGER, SAVAGE PEACE 172 (1995). 
99 The Lebanon Aid Bill--H.R. 2532 in its House incarnation and S. 639 in the Senate--had been 
introduced in the Senate on March 1, 1983 and in the House on April 13. See 129 Cong. Rec. 3295 & 8452 
(1983). 
100 See 129 Cong. Rec. 14,349-50 (1983) 
101 Steven R. Weisman, From Santa Barbara, Shock, Grief and Blame, N.Y. Times, August 30, 1983 
at A9.  
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disclaimed that the Marines were facing any imminent hostilities within the meaning of 
section 4(a)(1) of the WPR.102 The President also quickly escalated the conflict and 
ordered the additional deployment of 2,000 Marines to ships off the coast of Lebanon.103 
By September, Marines and naval units were actively shelling Muslim militia positions in 
villages near Beirut.  At this stage, it was becoming increasingly difficult for the 
administration to deny that the U.S. forces were not engaged in hostilities in Lebanon.  
Moreover, more members of Congress were becoming more assertive about their concerns 
in the ongoing crisis.104 Congressional leaders, including Senator Robert Byrd of West 
Virginia, were insisting that the WPR was operative and that the sixty-day time clock 
under section 4(a)(1) was triggered once the Marines were killed in action on August 29, 
1983.105 The President was also somewhat vulnerable from a political standpoint because 
the first national political poll on the deployment in almost a year suggested that only 40 
% of Americans were satisfied with how the President was handling the Lebanese 
intervention.106 
In this delicate political environment, the Congress and the President began to 
negotiate the proper contours of a congressional role in the Lebanese intervention.  The 
President warned that any signs of congressional opposition to the deployment were likely 
to send the wrong signal to the foreign adversary and terrorists.107 The President and 
Congress eventually reached a compromise position with legislation that expressly 
declared that hostilities in Lebanon started on August 29, 1983, but then authorized the 
deployment of the Marines for an additional eighteen months from the date of 
enactment.108 This new legislation—the Multinational Force in Lebanon 
Resolution(MFLR)—expressly disclaimed any intention to supersede the WPR even 
though it effectively rescinded the sixty-day triggering mechanism under section 4(a)(1) 
of the WPR.  Certain provisions were consistent with the spirit of the WPR: section 7 
gave Congress the authority to terminate the conflict at any time before the 18 month 
time limit by passing a joint Resolution; and section 4 required that the President seek 
congressional approval before expanding the mission of the Marine deployment.109 In 
signing the legislation, President Reagan praised the cooperative spirit of Congress but 
102 BOLGER, supra note __, at 179.  
103 William E. Farrel, U.S. Positioning 2000 Marines Off Beirut Coast, NY TIMES, September 2, 1983 
at A1.   
104 Id.
105 Hedrick Smith, Reagan Upgrading Lebanon Presence, NY TIMES, September. 13, 1983 at A1.  
106 See opinion polls data in Table 2 infra.
107 See Steven R. Weisman, White House Warns A War Powers Fight Hurts U.S. Interests, NY TIMES,
September 17, 1983, Section 1 (senior administration officials say that requiring defined time period will 
send wrong signal to foreign adversaries); Id. at 4 (“It’s also important that, particularly in sending a signal 
to the Syrians, that we not have a plan that promises that the troops are going to be out of Lebanon on a 
given day”).   
108 Felton, Domestic Debate Follows Lebanese Violence, 1983 Cong.  Q. 1912, 1912. 
109 See 129 Cong. Rec. 25,747 (1983) (text of S.J. Res. 159). 
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also expressly made it clear that he believed that his constitutional authority as the 
commander-in-chief was in no way constrained by the provisions of the WPR. 110 
The political cooperation that gave birth to the MFLR was short-lived.  On 
October 23, 1983, a bomb exploded outside the Marine barracks in Beirut and killed 269 
Marines.111 The mainstream media quickly attacked the President’s Middle-East policies 
and suggested that the public was growing frustrated with the role of U.S. forces in 
Lebanon.112 Various members of Congress reacted predictably with outrage.  Barely two 
days after the bombing several congressional democrats threatened to break ranks with 
the party leadership and craft a proposal that would cut off all funding for the Marines in 
Lebanon and force the President to withdraw the troops.113 Even members of Congress 
who supported the President acknowledged that the mood of Congress had changed 
significantly and that a reevaluation of the Marine deployment would be necessary.114 
On October 26, barely three days after the bombing in Beirut, the President 
ordered the invasion of the Caribbean island-nation of Grenada.115 The reasons given for 
the invasion were to quell the growing communist threat posed by political instability on 
that island and to rescue American citizens living on the island who were endangered by 
the ensuing political turmoil.116 The invasion ostensibly diverted the attention of the 
public and Congress from the events in Lebanon.  In the midst of these two ongoing 
crises, President Reagan went on national television to defend his actions. 
 
President Reagan’s television address to the nation on October 27, 1983 was a 
classic example of an attempt by the President to create a “rally round the flag” effect in 
the midst of an international crisis.  First, President Reagan announced that the 
objectives of both the Grenada and Lebanon invasions were similar and couched them in 
terms of defending American interests from a growing double threat of Soviet and Cuban 
communism.117 In Lebanon, the growing communist threat stemmed ostensibly from the 
alignment of Syrian and Soviet interests.  President Reagan insisted that only the United 
States and the other members of the multinational force could prevent the Syrians from 
toppling the government of President Amin Gemayal.118 In effect, the President framed 
the objectives of both engagements as an effort to protect the nation from a foreign 
threat—an objective that would be more amenable to the “rally around the flag effect” 
110 Ronald Reagan, statement upon signing PL 98-119 (Oct. 12, 1983), reprinted in 1983 Cong. Q. 
2142, 2142. 
111 See Strasser, supra  note __ at 1. 
112 Robert McFadden, Americans React to Attack with Frustration and Doubt, NY TIMES, 24 October 
1983, at A.9.  
113 Steven Roberts, Some Democrats Want Marines Out, NY TIMES, October 25, 1983 at A16.  
114 Id. 
115 Wednesday, October 26, 1983 Invasion of Grenada, NY TIMES, October 26, 1983 at B1.  
116 Drew Middelton, U.S. Forces: Need Arising for More Troops, Ships and Planes, NY TIMES,
October 26, 1983, at A 16.  
117 Quotation of the Day, NY TIMES, October 28, 1983, at B1.  
118 Transcript of Address by President on Lebanon and Grenada, NY TIMES, October 28, 1983, at 
A10.  
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than intervention in the internal political affairs of another country.119 Second, the 
President tried to reassure the country that the enemy was dangerous and had committed 
provocative acts that required decisive action.  In the Grenada context, for instance, 
President Reagan explained that that the only remnant of governmental authority 
involved the imposition of “a 24 hour curfew with orders to shoot on sight anyone found 
moving in those 24 hours.”120 He concluded that American citizens were under great 
danger and were seeking to escape from the political chaos.121 
In the end, both the impact of the Grenada invasion and President Reagan’s 
October 27 speech proved to be very effective at shaping public perception of the U.S. 
military role in Lebanon—at least in the short term.  A CBS/New York Times poll taken 
after the speech showed that 57.3 percent of Americans approved of the American 
government sending Marines to Lebanon—up from 40% from a similar poll in September 
and up from 53.8% from a poll the night before the speech.122 Among those who actually 
heard the President’s speech, however, the change was even more dramatic – 66.8 
percent actually approved of the Marine presence in Lebanon.123 In sum, the President’s 
speech on the Lebanese crisis in the wake of the Grenada invasion was an apt 
demonstration of an executive branch effort to gamble on the resurrection of public 
support in the midst of a significant foreign policy setback (the Beirut barracks tragedy).      
 
The public euphoria surrounding the Grenada invasion fizzled out by late 
November, however.  By December 1983, the public mood towards the deployment in 
Lebanon had changed significantly and so had the stance of major congressional leaders. 
Earlier that month, 8 American servicemen were killed in a raid against Syrian 
antiaircraft positions in East Beirut.124 In a Gallup poll in mid-December, about 52 
percent of the respondents said they thought it was a mistake for the United States to 
send the Marines to Lebanon.125 Democratic members of Congress in the House and 
Senate were busy introducing a variety of bills that would ostensibly cut-off funding for 
the Marine deployment in Lebanon.126 But it was not only Democratic members of 
Congress who were growing increasingly skeptical of the Lebanon deployment.  By late 
December, Congressman Robert Michel, the House Minority Leader, was urging 
President Reagan to pull out the Marines in Lebanon as soon as possible.127 Earlier, 
Senator Charles Mathias of Maryland, another prominent Republican legislator, 
119 See discussion in text at supra notes __  
120 See Denise Bostdorf, The Presidency and Promoted Crisis: Reagan, Grenada, and Issue 
Management, 21 PRES. STUD. Q, 737, 742 (1991). 
121 Id. 
122 See opinion polls data in Table 2 infra.
123 See Alan J Rosenblatt, Aggressive Foreign Policy Marketing: Public Response to Reagan's 1983 
Address on Lebanon and Grenada, 20 POL. BEHAVIOR 225, 236 (1998). 
124 Thomas Friedman, U.S. Ships Attack Syrian Positions in Beirut Region, NY TIMES, Dec. 14, 1983, 
at A1. 
125 Gallup Poll, Dec 9-12, 1983 in Table 2 infra. 
126 See 129 Cong. Rec. 28, 863 (1983). 
127 Philip Taubman, O’Neil Considers Backing a Change in Marine Mission, NY TIMES, December 30, 
1983, at A1.  
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announced that he would support a Resolution that would reduce the 18 month 
withdrawal timeframe under the MFLR to 6 months.128 
In the face of mounting public criticism of the Lebanese deployment and 
legislative threats to force a withdrawal of the troops, President Reagan mounted a public 
relations counter-offensive.   In his weekly radio address on December 10, 1983 President 
Reagan vowed in the face of growing casualties that American troops would remain in 
Lebanon until “internal stability is established.”129 Later on at a news conference in 
December 14,  President Reagan announced that the United States would not withdraw 
its troops until the government of Lebanon had control of its territory or until the 
complete collapse of order in that country.130 But the heat for pulling out was on and by 
late December, Walter Mondale—the Democratic frontrunner for the 1984 presidential 
election argued that the Marines should be pulled out of Lebanon immediately.131 A
further blow to the President came later that month: on December 28, 1983 a 
Department of Defense committee chaired by retired Admiral Robert Long released a 
devastating report that criticized the Marine presence in Lebanon and suggested that the 
Marine barracks tragedy was a result of failures in the chain of command.132 
Notwithstanding the critical tone of the Long Report, the Reagan administration 
continued to campaign actively for legislative and public support for a sustained Marine 
presence in Lebanon.133 But given the growing decline in public opinion polls in support 
of the deployment,134 the President’s public relations campaign was clearly faltering.  For 
instance, a Gallup poll of January 13-16, 1984 showed that about 70% disapproved of the 
way the President was handling the situation in Lebanon.135 In early January, both 
Democratic and Republican leaders in the House issued a statement saying that a 
reassessment of the U.S. policy in Lebanon was necessary.136 The Senate and House 
Democratic Caucus eventually endorsed a proposed bill that called for the immediate 
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Lebanon.137 
128 See John Felton, Senate Democrats Push Lebanon Policy Review, 1983 Cong. Q. 2359. 
129 Francis Clines, Reagan Defends Policy in Lebanon, NY TIMES, December 17, 1983, Section 1 at 
17. 
130 Steven Weisman, Reagan Predicts Role Till Beirut Stands or Falls, NY TIMES December 15, 1983 
at A1.  
131 See James Carity, Mondale says U.S. Must Get Marines Out of Beirut Now, NY TIMES, December 
31, 2003 at A1. 
132 See Report of the Long Commission, 1984 Cong. Q. 31 (Released Dec. 28, 1983).  
133 Michael Glennon, Lebanon Policy Is Questioned As Support Waivers on the Hill, 1984 Cong. Q. 3, 
3. 
134See Gallup Poll, Jan. 13-16, 1984 in Table 2 infra 
135 See Id. 
136 See Martin Tolchin, House Leaders Urge New Study of Beirut Policy, NY TIMES, Jan. 2, 1984 at 
A1; see also Steven Roberts, Support Waning for Beirut Role, NY TIMES, Jan 4, 1984 at A10 
137 See John Felton, Democrats Step Up Pressure for Beirut Pullout, 1984 Cong. Q. 227, 227-28; 
House Democrats Draft Resolution on Beirut Pullout, NY TIMES, February 1, 1984, at A1; see also Martin 
Tolchin, O’Neill Predicts House Will Back Resolution on Lebanon Pullout, NY TIMES, January 27, 1984, at A8.   
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Initially, the President was adamant and strongly opposed the proposed 
Democratic Resolution on the grounds that the Resolution would clearly make matters 
worse for the troops in Lebanon.138 In addition, the President seemed to react to the news 
by escalating the conflict and increasing the strikes on enemy positions in Lebanon.139 
Indeed, as the situation in Lebanon got worse, President Reagan’s level of resolve seemed 
to increase.140 But by early February, however, the President caved into congressional 
pressure and started drafting plans for the withdrawal of troops.141 By February 21, the 
Marines were deployed to ships offshore and by March 30, 1984 the United Stated 
formally ended its participation in the multinational forces deployed in Lebanon.142 
In announcing the withdrawal of U.S. troops, President Reagan insisted that the 
United States was not abandoning its mission in Lebanon but had instead decided to 
change tactics.143 Less than 2 weeks after President Reagan ordered the withdrawal of 
the troops and thanked Congress for its role, he went on the attack and blamed the 
congressional leadership for the failures in Lebanon.  The President claimed that although 
Congress had approved an 18 month deployment under the MFLR, “the subsequent 
second-guessing about whether to keep our men there severely undermined our policy.”144 
Various members of Congress countered this attack and argued that the failure of the 
Lebanese deployment was exclusively the President’s fault.145 
The President’s effort to place blame on Congress for the Lebanese debacle is 
consistent with what the theoretical model would predict.  Since Congress played such an 
active role by approving the Lebanon deployment and by pressuring the President to 
withdraw, the President wanted to make sure that Congress got its fair share of the blame 
138 See Francis Clines, White House Says Democrats Play Politics on Beirut, NY TIMES, February 2, 
1984 at A1 (arguing that the resolution “‘aids and abets’ those opposed to peace in the Middle East.”) 
139 See Richard Halloran, U.S. Warships and Jets Pound Lebanon Targets, NY TIMES February 7, 
1984, at A 17; see also Martin Tolchin, O’Neill Says U.S. Shelling Violates War Resolution, NY TIMES,
February 9, 1984, at A1.  
140 See Leslie Gelb, The U.S. Commitment Continues to Deepen, NY TIMES, February 7, 1984, at A 
16.  
 
141In this speech, the President announced that he “had asked Secretary of Defense Weinberger to 
present to me a plan for redeployment of the Marines from Beirut airport to their ships offshore.”  See Text 
of President’s Statement on Redeployment of Marines, NY TIMES, Feb. 8, 1984, at A16. 
142 See Text of President’s Letter on Multinational Force, NY TIMES, March 31, 1984 at 3; U.S. 
Withdrawing Its Military Force on Lebanon Coast, NY TIMES, March 31, 1984 at A1; Irvin Molotsky, 
Lawmakers Welcome Pullout from Lebanon, NY TIMES, April 1, 1984, Section 1 at 12. 
143 The President also made it clear that he was not ordering the Marines to “cut and run” in 
Lebanon, but was merely   “redeploying the troops.”  Francis Clines, White House Denies it Cuts and Runs,
NY TIMES, February 9, 1984, at A12. 
144 Excerpts from President Reagan’s Speech on Foreign Policy and Congress, NY TIMES, April 7, 1984 
at 6; see also Francis Climes, Reagan Attacks Congress’s Role on Many Fronts, NY TIMES, April 4, 1984 at A1; 
see also Shutlz Says Pullout Harmed U.S., NY TIMES, April 2, 1984 at A3. 
145 See Martin Tolchin, O’Neill Asserts Deaths in Beirut ‘Lie on’ Reagan, NY TIMES, April 5, 1984 at 
A12.  
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for the failure of the deployment.146 On the other hand, members of Congress, 
particularly those in opposition, were poised to exploit the President’s misfortunes in 
Lebanon.  Indeed, many of the Democratic Presidential candidates tried to make the 
Lebanese deployment a key issue in the election.  The Democratic Speaker of the House, 
who had been initially very supportive of the deployment called the President’s Lebanese 
policy “‘the biggest blunder, the biggest mistake [Reagan] had made in the White 
House.”147 Predictably, members of Congress who initially supported the Resolution 
authorizing the deployment claimed they were deceived because the President 
misrepresented the prospects for peace in the region.148 
The varying reactions of the President and Congress to public opinion surveys on 
the Lebanese deployment were also very informative.  As public opinion polls turned 
against the Lebanese deployment, congressional leaders (especially those on the 
opposition) turned up the heat and urged immediate withdrawal from Lebanon.  
Interestingly, however, when public opinion polls in the aftermath of President Reagan’s 
appeal to the nation on October 27, 1983 showed that a slight majority of Americans 
favored a sustained Lebanese deployment, leading members of Congress changed their 
tone during that period and seemed to resign themselves to a long term U.S. troop 
deployment.149 
146The administration subsequently acknowledged that seeking congressional approval of the 
deployment served a strategic purpose for the White House: it would mean that Congress would get to 
share the blame for any potential failure in the Lebanese intervention.  For instance, Deputy Secretary of 
State Eagleburger later stated that Congress has a share of responsibility because f its enactment of 
Multinational force in Lebanon Resolution.  See Felton, Democrats Step up Pressure for Beirut Pullout, 1984 
Cong. Q. 227, 227-28 
147 Martin Tolchin, O’Neill Asserts Deaths in Beirut ‘Lie on’ Reagan, NY TIMES, April 5, 1984 at 
A12.  
148 Id.
149 Steven Roberts, Pullout in Beirut Rejected in House, NY TIMES, Nov. 3, 1983, at A15.  
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ABC News / Washington Post NBC News / AP 
CBS News and New York Times The Gallup Poll
Questions:  (1)  ABC News / Washington Post:  Do you approve or disapprove of the US sending American troops to Lebanon to participate in the evacuation plan?  (08/17/82)  (2)  NBC News /  
AP:   Do you approve or disapprove of President Reagan sending American military troops to Lebanon?  (11/02/82)  (3)  CBS / NY Times:  US Marines went to Lebanon as part of an international 
peacekeeping force to try to prevent fighting there. Do you approve or disapprove of the government sending troops to Lebanon for that purpose?  (10/26/83; 10/27/83; 11/18/83 - 11/20/83)  (4)   
Gallup Poll:  Do you think we should keep the marines in Lebanon, or not?  (9/16/1983 - 9/19/1983)  Do you approve or disapprove of the way President Reagan is handling the situation in 
Lebanon?  (10/7/1983 - 10/10/1983; 11/18/1983 - 11/21/1983;  1/13/1984 - 1/16/1984)  Do you think the US should withdraw its troops from Lebanon at the present time, or not?  (02/10/84 - 
02/13/84)
Note:  Percentages were recalculated to eliminate "don't know," "not sure," and "no answer" responses.                     
The President’s response to the public opinion polls was remarkably different.    
Rather than capitulate and withdraw the Marines when public opinion polls turned 
against the deployment in December 1983 and January 1984, the President repeatedly 
went on a public relations offensive and attempted to explain why withdrawal would be a 
victory for terrorists and Syrian (and by extension Soviet) interests in the Middle East.150 
At various points in early 1984, President Reagan suggested that the enemy in the Middle 
150 See Hedrick Smith, Reagan Plan: Share Blame, NY TIMES, January 26, 1984 at B7 (“With public 
opinion survey showing a majority of American public favoring withdrawal . . ., Mr. Reagan tonight stressed 
an emerging Administration justification for keeping them there. ‘We must not be driven from our 
objectives for peace in Lebanon by state-sponsored terrorism.’”).  
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East was being emboldened by Congress’s lack of resolve on Lebanon and that a firm 
policy to stay the course would defeat the Syrians’ determination.151 The White House 
also tried to influence public opinion by emphasizing some of the military successes in that 
region.  Indeed, the White House’s positive spin on the deployment was so pervasive that 
Speaker of the House O’Neill reportedly accused the President of turning a blind eye to 
reality: “Every time I talk to you, you say things are going well, but there’s nothing but 
deterioration going on over there.” 152 In sum, rather than concede to public opinion 
polls and admit that the Lebanon deployment was a failure, President Reagan actually 
tried to resurrect public support by arguing that the situation in Lebanon was better than 
how the media portrayed it and that steadfastness would bring about victory in the end.  
Predictably, President Reagan also escalated the crisis by bombing selective enemy targets 
even as congressional and public support was declining rapidly.  
 
Finally, Congress’s response in the Lebanese crisis is consistent with what the 
model would predict.  After two consecutive months of declining public approval of the 
war, Congress moved decisively to constrain the President’s Lebanon military agenda.153 
In asserting its war powers role, Congress wielded the statutory tools that it had at its 
disposal, such as the WPR and the MFLR, to force the President to withdraw the 
troops.154 Had the President not agreed to a withdrawal in the early months of 1984, a 
congressional resolution under the WPR that would have forced such a withdrawal 
seemed all but inevitable.   In the end, President Reagan made it clear that in ordering 
the withdrawal from Lebanon he was not following his preferred military strategy but one 
foisted upon him by congressional leaders.  Moreover, the White House’s harsh public 
attack on the WPR and Congress’s role in the withdrawal from Lebanon is testament to 
the President’s belief that his national security options were constrained.  In sum, 
Congress’s effective use of the WPR in the Lebanon deployment is largely inconsistent 
with the conventional wisdom that the WPR is a useless statutory device that has only 
symbolic value.  
 
2.    Grenada.  On 25 October 1983, President Reagan  
announced that forces from the United States and some other Caribbean nations had 
begun landing on the Caribbean Island of Grenada.155 President Reagan announced he 
had ordered this intervention for three reasons: to protect American citizens—many of 
them students at St George’s School of Medicine; to prevent further breakdown in the 
151 Excerpts from U.S. Aide’s Statement on Reagan’s View of Marine Pullout, NY TIMES, February 3, 
1984 (“Syrian officials commented that the United States seemed ‘short of breadth.’  In short, when we 
showed steadiness of purpose, progress was being made.  When we wavered, progress stopped.  When we 
show that steadiness again, progress will resume.”).   
152 Steven Weisman, Aides Say President Started Pullback Process Weeks Ago, NY TIMES, February 9, 
1984 at A 12.  
153 See CQ Congress Collection, Foreign Policy, 1981-1984 Legislative Overview 
154 See Id.
155 President’s Remarks, 25 October 1983, Department of State Bulletin, vol. 83 (Dec. 1983), p. 
67. 
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political situation on the Island; and to restore law and order.156 The intervention 
occurred approximately 2 weeks after a coup deposed the leftist regime of Prime Minister 
Maurice Bishop.157 Subsequently, the coup plotters executed Bishop and declared a dusk 
to dawn curfew with instructions to shoot on sight any violators.  158 
The Grenadian military intervention occurred in the shadow of the bombing of 
the Marine Barracks in Lebanon; indeed, it occurred just 2 days after the Beirut tragedy.   
In many ways the events unfolding in Lebanon played a very key role in the military 
intervention in Grenada.  First, the 1,900 troops that were diverted to conduct the 
invasion of Grenada were actually bound for off-shore duty in Lebanon. 159 Second, the 
administration explicitly acknowledged that the decision to invade Grenada was in part 
prompted by the Barracks bombing in Lebanon because President Reagan was concerned 
that Grenada could become “another Beirut.” 160 Third, the shadow of the Barracks 
bombing framed the political landscape against which Congress reacted to the Grenada 
invasion.   
 
Like the initial deployments in Lebanon, Congress seemed to be left in the dark 
on the decision to invade Grenada.  In other words, the President did not formally consult 
with Congress before the invasion as required under section 3 of the WPR.  The President 
did invite a bipartisan group of congressional leaders to the White House on Monday, 24 
October 1983, but he apparently only confided in them details about a decision to invade 
he had already made three hours ago.161 The President did deliver a report, however, on 
the afternoon of October 27, which he mentioned that he was filing pursuant to his 
authority of the commander-in-chief of the United States armed forces and consistent 
with the WPR.162 The House moved quickly to invoke the triggering requirements of 
section 4(a)(1) of the WPR by passing the relevant legislation and the house version of 
the bill—H.J. Res. 402—passed on November 2, 1983.163 The Senate version of the bill 
was introduced as an amendment to a bill increasing the national debt ceiling, which was 
ultimately defeated on October 31, 1984.164 Congress eventually adjourned without ever 
successfully passing a two-chamber bill that formally invoked the WPR in the Grenadian 
invasion.165 In any event, the invasion was over in about a week and any further 
congressional action would have proven irrelevant by that time.  
156 Gary Williams, Prelude to an Intervention: Grenada, 29 J. Lat. Amer. Stud., 131-169 (1983).   
157 Id. at 133.   
158 Id.
159 Id. 
160 See Bernard Gwertzman, An Invasion Prompted by Previous Debacles, NY TIMES, October 26, 
1983, at A1.  
161See  President Reagan’s Letter to Senator Thurmond, (October 25, 1983), in 129 Cong. Rec. 
29,832 (1983); see also Hedrick Smith, 1,900 U.S. Troops, with Caribbean Allies, Invade Grenada and Fight, 
NY TIMES, October 25, 1983, at A1. 
162 See 129 Cong. Rec. 29,997 (1983). 
163 See 1983 Cong. Q. 2326.  
164 See 129 Cong. Rec. 29,835 (1983) 
165 Id.; see also Hedrick Smith, O’Neill Now Calls Grenada Invasion ‘Justified’ Action, NY TIMES,
Nov. 9, 1983, at A1. 
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Although the President did not seek a congressional role in the Grenada invasion, 
leading members of Congress were not indifferent about the invasion.  Since it occurred 
in the shadow of the Beirut Barracks bombing—an unpopular use of force incident, many 
members of Congress, especially those in the opposition, had an incentive to oppose the 
President’s move and they did so.   For instance, Senator Patrick Moynihan condemned 
the invasion as “an act of war” and added: “I don’t know that you restore democracy at 
the point of a bayonet.”166 Aside from leading members of the opposition, significant 
Republican members also expressed misgivings about the invasion.  Republican 
Representative Olympia Snowe, who served on the Foreign Affairs Committee, 
summarized the odd political posture of the invasion: “I’m dismayed we’re involved in 
Grenada, especially on the heels of Beirut  . . . The two events raise a lot of concerns 
about exactly what we’re doing.”167 Senator Weiker, a Republican from Connecticut, 
also accused Reagan of “flouting the law” by invading Grenada.168 Although House 
Speaker O’Neill was initially supportive of the invasion, he subsequently turned against 
the President and described the invasion as “gunboat diplomacy” with “frightening” policy 
implications.169 Other members of Congress, from both sides of the aisle, also complained 
that the invasion was illegal because President did not comply with the consulting 
requirements of the WPR .170 In addition to skeptical members of Congress, most of the 
United State’s traditional allies—including Great Britain, Italy and France—also strongly 
condemned the invasion.171 
Given the recent experience in Lebanon and the President’s political 
vulnerability, the congressional critics of the President’s Grenada policy probably believed 
that the invasion would prove to be a political miscalculation.172 In any event, they did 
not obviously expect the overwhelming military success of the invasion and the resulting 
166 See Steven Roberts, Capitol is Sharply Divided Over the Wisdom on Invading Grenada, NY TIMES,
October 25, 1983 at A22.  Senator Cranston of California described Reagan as a “trigger happy president . . 
. who has recklessly landed the United States in two civil wars.” Steven Roberts, Democrats Move on War 
Powers Act, NY TIMES, October 27, 1983 at A 18.  Senator Eagleton of Missouri attacked the purported 
objectives of the invasion: “The notion that American nationals were endangered is flimsy, illusory, and 
hypothetical.” Steven Roberts, Democrats Move on War Powers Act, NY TIMES, October 27, 1983 at A 18. 
167 See Responses are Wide-Ranging, NY TIMES, October 27, 1983 at A21. 
168 See Steve Roberts, O’Neill Criticizes President; War Powers is Invoked, NY TIMES, October 29, 
1983, at 4. 
169 Id. at 4.  
170 Congressman Torricelli lamented that “[The WPR] does not say in all cases except Grenada.  It 
does not say in all cases except when the Cubans are involved.  It says the President shall consult with the 
Congress in all cases.”  U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Grenada War Powers, Markup 
on H. J. Res. 402, October 27, 1983, 98th Cong., 1st Sess, 1983, 12; see also Steven Roberts, Capitol is 
Sharply Divided Over the Wisdom on Invading Grenada, NY TIMES, October 25, 1983 at A22; see also Steven 
Roberts, Democrats Move on War Powers Act, NY TIMES, October 27, 1983 at A 18 
171 See Bernard Gwertzman, Allies Criticism of U.S. Raises Wider Questions, NY TIMES, October 27, 
1983 at A21. 
172 See Steven Roberts, Democrats Move on War Powers Act, NY TIMES, October 27, 1983 at A 18 
(observing that with Grenada invasion there was “a growing belief among Democrats that they might be 
able to paint President Reagan as ‘trigger happy’ President in next year’s election campaign.”). 
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wave of patriotic euphoria that followed.173 As medical students arriving from St. George 
expressed gratitude and praise to the President for rescuing them,174 opinion polls in favor 
of the invasion soared.175 Invariably, the positive public opinion polls of the invasion were 
due in part to the President’s well-managed public relations campaign.  As the polls 
picked up, most of the President’s critics retreated.  By early November—which was a 
critical time in the opinion polls—the invasion was over and mainstream media had 
largely described it as a success.176 In an astonishing concession, Senator Moynihan 
retreated from his previous critical stance of less than two weeks ago and declared: “The 
move is popular and therefore there’s no disposition in the Senate to be opposed to it.”177 
Speaker of the House O’Neil also did an about-face and subsequently announced that the 
invasion was “justified” because American citizens on the island were in jeopardy.178 As 
demonstrated in the graph below, the change in the congressional response to the 
invasion in early November seemed to mirror the increase in public opinion polls in favor 
of the invasion. 
 
TABLE 3
Public Opinion Polls on the United States Invasion of Grenada, 1983 (in percentages) 
173 Draymond Ayres, U.S. Says Grenada Invasion is Succeeding; 600 Cubans Seized After Heavy 
Resistance, NY TIMES, Oct. 27, 1983, at A1. 
174 Robert McFadden, From Rescued Students, Gratitude and Praise, NY TIMES, October  28, 1983 at 
A1; First Evacuees Arrive in U.S. From Grenada, NY TIMES, October 27, 1983 at A1.  
175 See CBS News/NY TIMES Poll, Nov. 18-20, 1983 in Table 3 infra.
176 See Robert McFadden, From Rescued Students, Gratitude and Praise, NY TIMES, October  28, 
1983 at A1; First Evacuees Arrive in U.S. From Grenada, NY TIMES, October 27, 1983 at A1; Bernard 
Gwertzman, Reagan Gains by Grenada, But Mostly on His Own Turf, Ny Times, Nov. 6, 1983, at 41. 
177 See Hendrick Smith, Capitol Hill Outcry Softens as Public’s Support Swells, NY TIMES, November 
4, 1983, at A18. 
178 See Hedrick Smith, O’Neill Now Calls Grenada Invasion ‘Justified’ Action, NY TIMES, November 
9, 1983, at A1.  The invasion even won some adherents among European politicians who only a week ago 
seemed uniformly critical about the invasion.  John Vinocurs, Invasion of Grenada Wins Some Allied 
Supporters, NY TIMES, November 3, 1983, at A 23. 





































CBS News and NY Times The Gallup Poll Time Magazine
Questions: (1)  CBS / NY Times:  Do you approve or disapprove of sending the troops to Grenada?  (10/26/1983;  10/27/1983;  11/18/1983 - 11/20/1983)  (2)  Gallup Poll:  Do you 
approve or disapprove of the way President Reagan is handling Grenada?  (11/18/1983 - 11/21/1983)  (3) Time Magazine:  In general, do you feel that military activities of the US such as 
those in Grenada and Central America are in the best interests of the nation or not?  (12/06/1983 - 12/08/1983)   
Note:  Percentages were recalculated to eliminate "don't know," "not sure," and "no answer" responses.                  
On November 3, 1983, President Reagan, obviously basking in the glory of the 
successful invasion, announced that the objectives of the Grenada mission had been 
accomplished and that the troops would be home soon.179 In that same speech, he 
claimed that the military intervention was not an invasion after all—even though he had 
described as an invasion a week before—but a rescue mission.180 The White House’s 
focus on the rescue rationale of the Grenada invasion at the expense of other reasons that 
were put forth for the invasion was a strategic public relations success.181 
The Grenada invasion exhibited all the classic hallmarks of a successful military 
engagement: it was fairly rapid, it ostensibly involved the protection of American lives, 
and there were very few casualties.  The political risks to the President for not initially 
seeking congressional approval for the invasion were also very low.  Given that Grenada 
was a weak and small Caribbean island with an almost non-existent military force, the 
chances of military failure or stalemate were negligible.  Therefore, the President had very 
little need for the political insurance that prior congressional approval provides.  On the 
other hand, there were significant risks that seeking a congressional role would imperil 
the President’s chances for a quick and decisive military victory.  Given that the President 
was operating in the shadow of a relatively unpopular military undertaking in Lebanon 
179 See Transcript of the President’s News Conference on Rumsfeld and Grenada, NY TIMES, Nov. 4, 
1983, at A16.  
180 Francis Clines, It was a Rescue Mission, Reagan Says, NY TIMES, Nov. 4, 1983, at A16. 
181 See id. 
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which had recently taken a decisive turn for the worse, he was politically vulnerable.  
Indeed, the Grenada invasion actually took place in the immediate wake of the Marine 
barracks bombing in Beirut and at the time many members of Congress were actively 
clamoring for an immediate withdrawal from Lebanon.  In that political climate, it is 
unlikely that President Reagan would have had the opportunity to secure the quick 
congressional approval that would be necessary for a rapid and decisive military victory in 
Grenada. 
 
B.  The 1992-1993 intervention in Somalia 
 
Like Lebanon in 1982, Somalia in 1992 was a country that was deeply  
entrenched in a long and seemingly interminable civil war.  In January of that year the 
military regime of Siad Barre collapsed and the country descended into a chaotic civil war 
fuelled by the battle for territory by rival clans and warlords.  A famine ensued and by late 
1992 amidst horrifying television images of widespread suffering and starvation, President 
Bush decided to intervene as part of  a UN humanitarian mission (“UNOSOM I”).182 In 
December 1992 President Bush sent about 28,000 U.S. troops to the region to aid in the 
distribution of food and relief supplies.183 President Bush dubbed this relief operation 
“Operation Restore Hope” and it was one of the last major policy decisions he made 
before leaving office in early 1993.184 
President Bush did not seek congressional approval for the December 1992 
deployment even though the deployment involved a significant number of troops. Public 
opinion polls at the time reveal, however, that support for the intervention was 
overwhelmingly high with upwards of 70% of those polled supporting the operation.185 In 
this political climate, Congress was understandably deferential to the President and there 
was no visible congressional opposition to the deployment.  Admittedly, President Bush 
also reassured certain congressional leaders that there was no risk of imminent hostilities 
and that the troops were in Somalia for purely humanitarian purposes.186 
In early 1993 President Clinton took office and decided to continue the 
deployment.  On February 4, the United States Senate passed a Resolution in support of 
Operation Restore Hope—S.J. Res. 45—and declared that the Resolution was consistent 
with the WPR. 187 The Resolution also requested the transfer of the humanitarian 
mission to the UN at the earliest possible date.188 The House passed its own version of 
the Resolution on May 25 and the House version invoked the WPR more explicitly.189 
182 Michael Wines, Mission to Somalia; Bush Declares Goal in Somalia to 'Save Thousands,' NY TIMES,
Dec. 4, 1992, at Section 1. 
183 Senate Gives Belated Blessing to Somalia Intervention, 1993 Cong. Q. 277, 277. 
184 See id; Bush Sends U.S. Troops to Somalia, 1992 Cong. Q. 535, 535.  
185 See ABC News Poll, Dec. 11-14, 1992 in Table 5 infra.
186 See Carroll J. Doherty, The Reluctant Warriors, 1993 Cong. Q. 323, 323. 
187 Senate Gives Belated Blessing to Somalia Intervention, 1993 Cong. Q. 277, 277.  
188 Id.
189 139 Cong. Rec. H2764 (May 25, 1993).  
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The Senate and House versions were never reconciled, however, so the Resolution never 
really became law.   
 
The situation in Somalia want smoothly for the first half of 1993 and the United 
States started to transfer control over the mission to the UN (UNOSOM II) in May 1993.  
UNOSOM II was the result of a new UN Resolution—strongly supported by the Clinton 
administration—that expanded the UN mission in Somalia to include economic 
rehabilitation and political reconciliation.190 By the time the transfer was completed only 
about 4,000 United States troops remained in Somalia.191 There were no American 
casualties during that period and the relief effort seemed to be largely successful.  Public 
opinion polls taken in early 1993 continued to show significant public support for the 
operation.192 
By mid-year 1993, the events in Somalia took a decisive turn for the worse.   With 
the significant reduction of the United States military presence after the transfer of 
control to the UN, factional fighting increased in the capital city of Mogadishu and the 
outlying areas.  On June 5, a faction led by Muhammad Farah Aidid ambushed and killed 
23 Pakistani peacekeepers.193 The UN Security Council denounced the incident and 
ordered the arrest and punishment of all those responsible.194 The United States troops—
who were originally deployed for a disaster relief mission—were ordered to get involved in 
a mission to find and arrest Aidid and his accomplices.195 But President Clinton never 
sought congressional authorization for this expansion of the role of the U.S. troops.     
 
With the expansion of the UN mission to include tracking down warlords, the 
clashes with Aidid’s forces escalated.  On August, 4 U.S. troops were killed in a bomb 
explosion.196 Then in early September, a U.S. helicopter operation resulted in the death 
of almost 200 Somali citizens, including women and children.197 Moreover, in that same 
period 7 Nigerian peacekeepers were killed.198 In the later part of September a U.S. army 
Blackhawk helicopter was shot down resulting in the death of 3 U.S. soldiers.199 By late 
September the public opinion polls in support of the operation had dipped to around 40 
percent.200 
190 S.C. Res. 814, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (1993). 
191 U.S. General Hands Over Relief Operation in Somalia to U.N., NY TIMES, May 5, 1993, at A5. 
192 See Time/CNN Poll, Jan. 13-14, 1993 in Table 5 infra.
193 Jennifer S. Thomas, A Somalia Chronology, 1993 Cong. Q. 2826, 2826. 
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195See  Bolger, supra note __, at 300-01. 
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As the public opinion in support of the U.S. role in Somalia declined leading 
members of Congress started to demand withdrawal of United States troops.  On 
September 8, 1994, Senator Byrd introduced a bill that would automatically terminate 
funding for the Somalia mission in thirty days unless Congress authorized a continuation 
of the deployment.201 On September 9, the Senate passed a watered down version of 
Senator Byrd’s bill which required the President to notify Congress of the objectives of the 
deployment by October 15, and to seek congressional authorization for a continued 
deployment by November 15. 202 In approving an identical version of the Senate bill on 
September 28, the House purportedly decided to “put the White House on notice that 
Congress is losing patience with a mission that has gone from feeding the starving to 
hunting down a faction leader.”203 
In October 1993, the situation in Somalia reached its nadir.  On October 3, 18 
U.S. soldiers were killed and over 70 wounded in a firefight with Aidid’s forces in 
Mogadishu.204 As the television cameras focused on the body of a dead American soldier 
dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, public opinion in support of the operation 
eroded dramatically.  In a poll taken on October 7, public support had dropped to 35 
percent from a January high of over 80 percent.205 As public opinion in support of the 
operation declined, congressional pressure for an immediate withdrawal increased.  In 
mid-October the Senate passed a bill that called for the automatic termination of all 
funding for U.S. operations in Somalia by March 31, 1994.206 Later in October 
Congressman Gilman introduced a bill in the House that called for cutting of funding for 
the operation and the withdrawal of all American troops by January 31, 1994.207 Under 
congressional pressure, President Clinton agreed to the March 31, 1994 withdrawal date 
proposed in the Senate bill.208 
As the model would predict, Congress and the President took radically different 
approaches to the negative turn in public opinion polls after the October incident in 
Mogadishu.   As voices on Capital hill and elsewhere clamored for an immediate 
withdrawal, President Clinton warned that the United States should not cut and run.  
“Our leadership in world affairs would be undermined,” the President insisted, “and all 
around the world, aggressors, thugs and terrorists will conclude that the best way to get us 
201 See 139 Cong. Rec. 11123, 11124 (Sept. 8, 1993). 
202See 139 Cong. Rec. 11123, 11124, 11272-77 (Sept. 9, 1993). 
203Clifford Krauss, House Vote Urges Clinton to Limit American Role in Somali Conflict, NY TIMES,
Sept. 29, 1993, at A1, A6. 
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205 See ABC News Poll, Oct. 7, 1993 in Table 5 infra.
206 Amend. No. 1-42, to the 1994 Defense Appropriations Act, reprinted in 139 Cong. Rec. S13, 
516 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1993) 
207 139 Cong. Rec. E 2451 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1993). 
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to change our policies is to kill our people.”209 In the same early October speech President 
Clinton announced that he was going to increase the troop levels from 4,700 to about 
20,000 troops.210 The President acknowledged that in response to the increased military 
capacity of the warlords in Somalia, increased troop levels were needed to prevent 
Somalia from descending into anarchy.211 He acknowledged, however, that he would pull 
out the troops by March 31 but insisted that he would “leave on our terms.”212 He also 
tried to distance the American military role from the UN and clarified that the troops 
would be under U.S. and not UN command.213 
The decline in public opinion in support of the war was also consistent with the 
hypothesis that the American public support for the use of force tends to be at its lowest 
ebb when the military engagement involves significant casualties and the primary 
objective of the engagement involves the imposition of internal political change.  Initially, 
when the military objective in Somalia just involved the delivery of humanitarian relief, 
the public support for the operation was significantly high.  When the military objective 
devolved into a manhunt for Aidid, however, the public began to view the U.S. military 
as being drawn into a messy civil war that had no clear U.S. security implications.  The 
President was also hard-pressed to come up with any plausible argument that would 
suggest that the Somali factions involved in this civil war imposed any threat to American 
security.  As depicted in the graph below, public opinion in support of the Somali 
operation was fairly high in the late 1992 and early 1993, but declined significantly in 
September in the wake of the first U.S. casualties and the killing of about 200 Somali 
citizens by U.S. helicopter crews.  It then dropped precipitously after the October firefight 
that killed 18 U.S. soldiers.  
 
TABLE 5
Public Opinion Polls on the United States Intervention in Somalia, 1992-1993 (in 
percentages) 
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ABC News CBS News
Questions: (1)  Time/CNN Poll: Do you approve or disapprove of the presence of US troops in Somalia? (01/13/1993 - 01/14/1993)  (2)  Gallup Poll: Do you think the US should 
continue its role of active military involvement in Somalia, or should it stop?  (09/10/1993 - 09/12/1993)  Has the operation in Somalia been successful, or unsuccessful?  (10/05/1993)  Do 
you approve or disapprove of the way Bill Clinton is handling the situation in Somalia?  (10/08/1993 - 10/10/1993)  (3) ABC News:  Do you approve or disapprove of Bush's decision to send 
US troops Somalia?  (12/11/92 - 12/14/92)  Do you approve or disapprove of the way Bill Clinton is handling the situation in Somalia?  (10/05/1993; 10/07/1993; 10/12/1993)  (4) CBS News:  
Do you think the US should be sending US troops to Somalia to try and make sure shipments of food get through to the people there, or should US troops stay out?  (12/06/92)  Do you 
approve or disapprove of the way Bill Clinton is handling the situation in Somalia?  (10/18/1993 - 10/19/1993)       
Note:  Percentages were recalculated to eliminate "don't know," "not sure," and "no answer" responses.                     
Finally, congressional reaction to the dip in public opinion polls in fall 1993 was 
also consistent with what the model would predict.  Indeed, in the wake of the October 3 
incident, Senator Dole, the Republican leader announced: “If there were a vote today, 
we’d be out today.” 214 Lawmakers also demanded immediate plans for a Somali exit from 
leading White House officials like Defense Secretary Les Aspin and Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher.215 Formal congressional action to cut off funds for the operation 
subsequently followed.216 In the end, President Clinton withdrew the troops from Somalia 
under the threat of congressional intervention.  
 
C. The 2003 Invasion of Iraq 
 
In many ways, the 2003 invasion of Iraq is a classic demonstration of the 
President’s unique ability to frame public opinion by escalating an international crisis.   
Indeed, from summer 2002 through mid-2003, Iraq overshadowed most other issues in 
the popular media.  However, the presidential saber-rattling that foisted Iraq into the 
headlines in the fall of 2002 started much earlier; as early as October 2001 presidential 
aides had suggested expanding the war against the Taliban to Iraq.217 President Bush 
214 Thomas Friedman, Somalia Mission; Clinton Reviews Policy in Somalia as Unease Grows, NY 
TIMES, October 6, 1993, at A1.  
215 Id. 
216 Id. 
217 Elaine Sciolino & Patrick Tylera, Nation Challenged: Saddam Hussein; Some Pentagon Officials 
and Advisers Seek to Oust Iraq's Leader in War's Next Phase, NY TIMES, Oct. 12, 2001, at B6.  
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subsequently hinted at a link between al-Quada and Iraq in his January 2002 state of the 
union address in which he famously described Iraq as a member of the “axis of evil.”218 
Then in an address to graduating cadets at West Point in early June 2002, the President 
publicly announced the outlines of his new doctrine for preventive action in which he 
urged that it would be necessary for the United States to “take the battle to the enemy, 
disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge.”219 Later that month 
the Washington Post released a report about a new national security strategy in which the 
President “signed an intelligence order directing the CIA to undertake a comprehensive, 
covert program to topple Saddam Hussein, including authority to use lethal force to 
capture the Iraqi president.” 220 
Although Iraq was already beginning to dominate the headlines by late July 
2002, the President did not take his case for war to the public until later that fall.  Indeed, 
in mid-August the President was still urging a more cautious approach and mentioned he 
was going to “look at all options” available to him before making a decision.221 By later 
that month, however, the administration had changed its tone and was suggesting that 
Iraq’s threat to peace in the region through its potential nuclear programs made the 
removal of Saddam Hussein necessary.222 Like what the model would predict, the 
administration couched the objectives of the war largely in terms of a response to foreign 
aggression: the President insisted that a preemptive strike was necessary because Iraq had 
weapons of mass destruction that it could likely use against the United States and that 
there was a clear link between Iraqi regime and the al-Qaeda terrorists who launched the 
September 11, 2001 attacks.223 Moreover, the President made clear that waiting for Iraq 
to act first was not an option:  “The danger is clear: using chemical, biological, or one day, 
nuclear weapons provided by Iraq, the terrorists could one day kill thousands of people in 
our country or any other.”224 
While it is not clear why the White House decided to shift tactics from exploring 
non-use of force options in mid-August, the proximity of a mid-term congressional 
election probably factored heavily in its calculations.  By late August 2002, however, it 
was still unclear whether the President would actually seek congressional authorization 
for the use of force.  Like his predecessors, including Reagan, Clinton, and his father, 
President Bush initially disclaimed any constitutional role for Congress and argued that 
he could embark on the use of force solely on the authority of his role as commander-in-
218 George W. Bush's Moment, NY TIMES, Jan. 30, 2002, at A26. 
219Elisabeth Bumiller, U.S. Must Act First to Battle Terror, Bush Tells Cadets, NY TIMES, June 2, 
2002, at Section 1.  
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August 27, 2002, at A1. 
223 See Mike Allen, Bush Asserts That Al-Qaeda Has Links to Iraq’s Hussein, Washington Post, 
September 26, 2002, at A1; Eric Schmitt, Rumsfield Says U.S. Has “Bulletproof Evidence” of Iraq’s Links to Al 
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2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news /releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html. 
 A Positive Theory of the War Powers Constitution 47
chief.225 The political background in which presidents usually make such 
pronouncements suggest that it is a tactical move:  the President initially declines to 
concede Congress’s constitutional authority to approve the use of force in order to avoid 
establishing legal or political precedent for President acquiescence, but then subsequently 
seeks congressional approval ostensibly on political grounds.  In other words, presidents 
seem to prefer to seek congressional approval for the use of force in a context in which it 
does not look like they are bound by a constitutional requirement. In any event, by early 
September the President requested congressional authorization to go to war in Iraq but 
insisted that such authorization take place immediately.   Furthermore, polls conducted 
around that time revealed that a majority of Americans did not want the President to go 
to war without congressional authorization.226 
With the mid-term elections around the corner, President Bush’s decision to seek 
immediate congressional authorization for the Iraqi invasion in September 2002 turned 
out to be a good tactical move.  In the weeks before he requested congressional 
authorization, the White House aggressively mobilized public opinion by making public 
pronouncements that an invasion of Iraq was imminent.227 At the time there were deep 
divisions regarding the propriety of unilateral action against Iraq in prominent circles, 
including among leading Republic foreign policy experts.228 Given these divisions, it was 
important for the President to get a vote on the war before the election when members of 
Congress were most politically vulnerable, otherwise a protracted congressional debate 
about the merits of the war would likely ensue in January.  Although the public opinion 
polls at the time did not necessarily endorse unilateral action by the United States, 
members of Congress were probably aware that an extensive debate about the merits of 
the war would not play in their favor in the mid-term election.  Indeed, members of 
Congress, especially those in the opposition, likely thought it would be in their electoral 
interests to quickly approve the President’s request because they did not want to appear 
hesitant and weak on national security issues—especially in the aftermath of September 
11.229 For those democratic members of Congress who had presidential political 
aspirations, support for the use of force against Iraq came early and it was largely 
unequivocal.230 
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On October 7, 2002, days just before Congress voted on the Iraq Resolution, 
President Bush once again went public to make his case for war and declared in a thirty-
minute speech that “confronting the threat posed by Iraq is crucial to winning the war on 
terror.” 231 A few days later a significant majority in the House—296-133—approved the 
Resolution and it passed by an even more significant margin in the Senate—77-23.232 
Although there were some Democratic critics against the Resolution, such as Senator 
Robert Byrd of West Virginia, a majority of Democratic members of Congress voted with 
their Republican colleagues.  Byrd had been an early and vocal opponent of the use of 
force since February 2002,233 but his position did not seem to resonate strongly among his 
colleagues.  In many respects, Senator Byrd has been somewhat of an institutional 
iconoclast on the use of force—having openly opposed presidential war-powers initiatives 
since the Vietnam conflict.  But most members of Congress do not enjoy Senator Byrd’s 
inscrutable stature as a politician; and since these other elected officials are likely to be 
more electorally vulnerable than Senator Byrd they probably decided it unwise to stand in 
the way of the President’s national security agenda.  Rather than insist on their 
institutional war-powers prerogative, these politically cautious members of Congress 
probably calculated that it was more prudent to focus their attention on domestic issues 
like the economy and health care—issues that would presumably be more relevant to 
their political fortunes in the November elections.234 
The President’s reaction to the public opinion polls in favor of the war was 
consistent with what the model would predict.  Initially, the President’s selling of the war 
to the American public was not easy.   Despite initial tepid support for an Iraqi invasion, 
the President waged an aggressive public relations campaign that focused on the 
imminence of the danger imposed by Saddam Hussein and his historical belligerence in 
the face of multilateral sanctions.   Although the polls showed support for the President’s 
handling of the situation in Iraq during much of the fall of 2002 through March 2003, a 
majority also thought that that the United States should only go to war against Iraq with 
UN support.235 Nonetheless, despite reservations in the polls about the United States 
proceeding unilaterally, by early September a significant majority of Americans indicated 
such a coalition.  See id. ; see also Dan Balz & Jim VandeHei, Democratic Hopefuls Back Bush on Iraq, WASH.
POST, Sep. 14, 2002. 
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that they thought that a war against Iraq was inevitable.236 By late February, as 
diplomatic efforts seemed to fail, more Americans seemed resigned to the prospect that a 
UN-approved intervention was no longer possible and public support in favor of a US-led 
intervention increased.237 Once the war actually started on March 19, support for the war 
hit the 70 percent mark and stayed there for the course of the war.238 On March 20, the 
U.S. Senate voted 99-0 in support of the President’s invasion of Iraq. 239 
TABLE 6
Public Opinion Polls on the United States Invasion of Iraq, 2002-2003 (in percentages) 
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Questions: (1)  CBS News:  Do you approve or disapprove of the US taking military action against Iraq to try and remove Saddam Hussein from power?  (8/6/02 - 8/7/02;  9/22/02 - 
9/23/02;  10/27/02 - 10/31/02;  11/20/02 - 11/24/02;  1/4/03 - 1/6/03);  Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling the situation with Iraq?  (2/10/03 - 2/12/03;  
3/7/03 - 3/9/03;  3/15/03 - 3/16/03;  4/11/03 - 4/13/03;  5/9/03 - 5/12/03;  7/8/03 - 7/9/03;  9/15/03 - 9/16/03;  10/20/03 - 10/21/03;  12/14/03 - 12/16/03)       
Note:  Percentages were recalculated to eliminate "don't know," "not sure," and "no answer" responses.                    
Rather than let the public opposition for unilateral action fester in the build-up to 
the invasion of Iraq, President Bush undertook a broad initiative to convince the public 
that he had exhausted diplomatic options and that Hussein’s regime constituted an 
imminent threat.   Through a combination of high profile speeches before the war and 
carefully orchestrated televised programs that showed possible nuclear and chemical 
weapons facilities, President Bush was able to overcome public skepticism of unilateral 
intervention.   President Bush was also able to sell the invasion as a multilateral 
intervention—even in the absence of a UN Resolution—by assembling a “coalition of the 
willing.”240 The rapid and overwhelming nature of the U.S. led coalition’s victory 
eventually cemented public approval for the war.  At the conclusion of the main ground 
war, a significant percentage of Americans expressed confidence that war went well.  
Indeed, public opinion polls by Gallup in April showed that a majority of Americans said 
the war would still be justified even if the U.S. did not discover any weapons of mass 
destruction.241 
Although the Iraq invasion officially ended about a month after it started, the 
military activities in Iraq are still ongoing and it is hard to predict whether public support 
for the “nation-building” aspect of the intervention will last.  As the experience with the 
1982-1983 Lebanese intervention shows, the American public tends not to have a strong 
appetite for prolonged military engagements, especially when there are significant 
240 See Elisabeth Bumiller, Threats and Responses: The Allies; In Blunt Words, Bush Threatens 
Hussein Again, NY TIMES, Nov. 21, 2002, at A1.  
241 See Gallup Poll, April 11-13, 2003.  
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casualties and where the perceived threat to the United States’ security interest is not 
obvious.  Public support for the Iraqi invasion has declined somewhat significantly from 
its peak levels in April 2003, although the President received a bump in December 2003 
after the capture of Saddam Hussein.  The model predicts that if public support for the 
invasion falls below 50 percent for a sustained period of time (let us say two months), 
congressional intervention in support of a troop withdrawal is very likely.   Nonetheless, 
in the shadow of the terrorist attacks of September 11, a majority of Americans still give 
President Bush high marks for his efforts in combating international terrorism.  Indeed, 
during the 2004 election campaign, President Bush maintained a consistent lead over his 
Democratic challenger on the question of whom Americans trusted more on the issue of 
national security and fighting terrorism—a factor that likely contributed to the President’s 
2004 reelection victory.242 
D. The Cases That do Not Seem to Conform to the Model 
 
The build-up to all the conflicts described in the foregoing case studies were all 
consistent with what a political insurance and signaling model would predict.  But there 
are a variety of other uses of force (or decisions not to use force) that one cannot easily 
harmonize with the stylized political insurance or signaling model.  This Section addresses 
three such cases: the Korean war of the 1950s; the Cuban missile crisis of 1963; and the 
1999 military intervention in Kosovo. 
 
At first blush, the American military intervention in Korea that started in 1950 
seems like an anomaly because it involved a high stakes conflict in which the President 
did not obtain prior congressional authorization.243 With respect to the political 
insurance that congressional authorization accords, however, one could argue that 
President Truman acquired enough such insurance by successfully securing the approval 
of the UN Security Council before he started deploying troops in the region.244 But in the 
modern era presidents have still sought congressional authorization for the use of force 
even after the obtaining approval of the UN Security Council.245 In any event, however, 
there is less to the lack of formal congressional authorization for the Korean conflict than 
meets the eye.  Although Congress never formally authorized U.S. involvement in the 
Korean crisis, congressional leaders from both sides of the aisle publicly endorsed 
President Truman’s commitment of troops.246 Indeed, Truman actually sought to present 
242Jodi Wilgoren,  The 2004 Campaign: Political Memo; Kerry Blends His Attacks on Bush Record, NY 
TIMES, Oct. 20, 2004, at A 20 (observing the despite setbacks in Iraq “polls show that voters still trust Mr. 
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authorization).  
244 See id. at 24-27 (discussing President Truman’s efforts to seek a UN Security Council Resolution 
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UN Security approval and authorization from Congress.  See HESS, supra note __ at 162-63; 189-90. 
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the Korean crisis to Congress but was repeatedly rebuffed by legislative leaders who told 
him that it was unnecessary to seek congressional authorization for what was already a 
really popular decision.247 Robert Taft, a Republican Senator from Ohio, did publicly 
challenge the constitutionality of President Truman’s action on the Senate floor, but he 
also made it clear that had President Truman sought congressional authorization, he 
would have voted for it.248 In the end, there is sufficient evidence that Congress had 
endorsed the Korean crisis informally even if it did not do so through formal legislative 
action.  
 
One of the gravest foreign policy crises of the post-WWII era was the Cuban 
missile crisis of 1963.   Yet President Kennedy did not formally seek congressional 
authorization before making his decision to mount a blockade to induce the removal of 
Soviet missiles from Cuba.249 Moreover, President Kennedy decided not to use force 
against the Cubans or the Soviets in the midst of a rapidly escalating crisis and yet he did 
not seem to suffer any domestic audience costs.  Indeed, the public opinion polls at the 
time overwhelmingly endorsed President Kennedy’s decision to mount a blockade against 
Soviet ships.250 
A broader examination of the Cuban missile crisis yields some factors that go a 
long way in reconciling some of the apparent inconsistencies between that crisis with 
what the political insurance and signaling model would predict.  First, the Cuban missile 
crisis ostensibly involved an international crisis that was foisted upon the United States in 
which the President had little choice but to react.  Indeed, President Kennedy 
purportedly viewed presidential inaction on the Cuban Missile Crisis as possible basis for 
impeachment.251 Thus, unlike most of the conventional use of force cases, the President 
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Congress, asking specifically whether he should seek a declaration of war . . . But everywhere he 
turned, Congressional leaders told him that he had ample authority under the Constitution and 
under the Charter to do what he was doing, and they went further and told him that he should 
"stay away" from Congress. 
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World Trade Center, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 865, 869 (2004). 
248 See HESS, supra note __ at 26. 
249 For a brief synopsis of the Cuban Missile Crisis, see “An Overview of the Crisis,” available at 
hht://library.thinkquest.org/11046/days.index.html; see also GRAHAM ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION:
EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1971).   
250 See Tom W. Smith, The Polls-Trends: The Cuban Missile Crisis and U.S. Public Opinion, 67 
PUBLIC OPINION Q 265, 269-70 (2003). 
251 Robert Kennedy, who was then Attorney-General, reported this colloquy he had with his 
brother regarding the risk of confronting the Soviet Union over the crisis.  Robert Kennedy: “I just don’t 
think there was any choice… and not only that, if you hadn’t you would have been impeached.”  President 
Kennedy: “That’s what I think . . . I would have been impeached.”  (quoted in Richard Lebow, The Cuban 
Missile Crisis: Reading the Lessons Correctly, 98 POL. SC. Q 431, 433 (1983)).  
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did not play an active role in creating or escalating the Cuban missile crisis.252 One could 
argue that when a foreign adversary commits acts of aggression on U.S. soil, or in close 
proximity to U.S. soil, the President may have no option but to react by using force or 
taking decisive measures short of using force.  Because it is almost certain that the 
President will react in those situations, the signaling value or the political insurance 
afforded by congressional authorization for the use of force diminishes.  Thus, in those 
instances where the President has responded to attacks on U.S. soil—such as in WWII 
after the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor or in Afghanistan after the September 11 
terrorist attacks—the President could have plausibly dispensed with congressional 
authorization without suffering significant domestic audience costs.   
 
Second, President Kennedy’s choice of a blockade rather than a use of force 
during the Cuban missile crisis also makes sense because a use of force could have 
resulted in a nuclear showdown between the Soviet Union and the United States.253 All 
else equal, the domestic audience will likely not prefer a use of force incident when the 
prospects of prevailing in a military engagement are trivial.  Given that a full-fledged war 
between the Soviet Union and the United States would in all likelihood be unwinnable by 
either side, public opinion polls at the time showed a strong preference for a reaction to 
the crisis that would fall short of a use of force.254 
Finally, the American military intervention in Kosovo in 1999 also presents 
somewhat of a challenge to the political insurance model.  In March 1999, President 
Clinton ordered air strikes against Serbian forces in Kosovo in order to protect ethnic 
Albanians in Kosovo from Serbian aggression.255 Congress never formally approved the 
Kosovo operation and President Clinton justified his unilateral action as an exercise of his 
constitutional authority as chief executive and commander in chief.256 The 
constitutionality of President Clinton’s Kosovo decision eventually became the basis of 
lawsuit filed by Representative Thomas Campbell and about two-dozen other members of 
Congress.257 
While Kosovo seems like a separation of powers anomaly, certain factors suggest 
that it could be reconciled with a political insurance model.  First, the Kosovo crisis was 
252 See, e.g., Fearon, supra note __ at 579 (“Historically, war has virtually followed from the 
deliberate choice of state leaders, if not always as the result they originally intended.”) 
253 See ALLISON, supra note __ at 59 (“An invasion would force American troops to confront 
20,000 Soviets in the Cold War’s first case of direct contact between troops of the superpowers.  Such 
brinkmanship courted nuclear disaster, practically guaranteeing an equivalent move against Berlin”).  
254 See Smith, supra note __ at 271 (observing that public opinion polls showed that 83 percent 
approved of the blockade decision while a consistent majority opposed the invasion of Cuba).  
255 For a brief factual background of the Kosovo intervention, see Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 29 
(2000).  For an analysis of the international law and constitutional implications of the Kosovo intervention, 
see John Yoo, Kosovo, War Powers, and the Multilateral Future, 148 U. PA. L. REV 1673 (2000).  
256 See Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 35 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 527-28 (Mar. 26, 1999).   
257 See Campbell, 203 F.3d at 29-30; see also Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34, 37 (D.D.C. 
1999). 
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not a particularly high risk engagement because it mostly involved aerial attacks without 
any significant commitment of ground troops.  Second, President Clinton received some 
congressional political insurance when the Senate (but not the House) passed a 
resolution two days before he ordered the attack authorizing the President to conduct 
military air operations in conjunction with other NATO forces.258 Furthermore, the 
House, which failed to support the Senate resolution authorizing the use of force, 
subsequently defeated a resolution that would have required the President to remove all 
troops from Yugoslavia.259 Finally, Congress also agreed to increase funding for the 
Kosovo operation,260 although it never formally authorized the war. 
 
In many respects, the Kosovo intervention represents a low-level international 
crisis in which the President sought and obtained from Congress a form of low-level 
political insurance.  Because the intervention involved mostly aerial attacks on Serbian 
targets, it did not represent a sufficient threat in terms of potential casualties to American 
troops to warrant full-blown political insurance from Congress.  Given that Congress was 
willing to increase funding for the intervention and that the Senate had already passed a 
resolution supporting the use of force, the President likely thought he had sufficient 
political insurance to engage in a limited aerial bombing campaign.   
 
III.    IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY FOR NORMATIVE WAR POWERS 
SCHOLARSHIP 
The widespread assumption that pervades much of the normative war powers 
scholarship and judicial commentary is that the President and Congress are in a perpetual 
battle for supremacy in foreign affairs.261 But this assumption is mistaken.  Congress is not 
an empire builder in war powers; in most instances the incentives of individual members 
of Congress may actually be flatly inconsistent with that of increasing the overall 
institutional prerogative of Congress.   
 
This Article has shown that when the President first initiates an international 
crisis, public opinion usually supports the President’s preferred course of military action.  
The positive electoral payoffs that come from piggybacking on the President’s national 
security agenda means that members of Congress have a strong incentive to initially 
support the President’s use of force decisions regardless as to whether those decisions 
diminish the overall institutional prerogatives of Congress.  But when public opinion 
258 S. Con. Res. 21, 106th Cong. (1999). 
259 See H.R. Con. Res. 82, 106th Cong. (1999).  The House did reject the Senate resolution 
authorizing the conflict by a tie vote of 213 to 213.  Moreover, the House also rejected a resolution 
providing for the declaration of war by a vote of 427 to 2.  See H.R.J. Res. 44, 106th Cong. (1999).  
260 See 1999 Emergency Supp. Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-31, tit 11, ch. 3, 113 Stat. 57 
(1999) (providing funds for operations for operations in Yugoslavia).    
261 See Daryl Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 
915-17 (2005) (discussing prevalence of empire-building approach in separation of powers scholarship).  
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turns against the President’s conduct of a war, members of Congress have political 
incentives to constrain the President’s national security initiatives.  
 
This Article does not mean to suggest that all normative scholarship embraces a 
bright-line approach to the allocation of war powers or assumes that a struggle for 
institutional supremacy is undesirable.  Indeed, pro-President scholars like John Yoo have 
argued that both the constitutional text and structure support a much more flexible 
approach to war powers in which both Congress and the President can compete for 
control over war-making.262 Although Yoo does not seek to explain the war powers 
interactions between Congress and the President, the normative vision he depicts seems 
to accord with much of the reality of political branch interaction on war powers.  
However, while Yoo seems to be less sanguine about a more assertive congressional role in 
war powers,263 the evidence does show that members of Congress do play a more 
prominent role in constraining the President’s decision to use force when there are 
electoral incentives for doing so.   
 
The rest of this Article argues that the most of the conventional prescriptions for 
addressing the lack of congressional assertiveness in war powers are unlikely to work given 
certain realities of political branch interaction in foreign affairs. 
 
A. Why Congress Does not Have an Incentive to Change the Balance of War 
Powers 
The starting point for much of the literature regarding the proper division of war 
powers is usually an effort to apply traditional interpretive canons of constitutional law to 
the textual language that discusses the authority to conduct war.   For instance, 
references abound in the war powers literature to canonical phrases like original intent, 
formalism, textualism, and functionalism.  The assumption is that after positing what the 
proper division should be, the relevant institutional parties, such as Congress and the 
President, would then adjust their behavior to fit the outcome dictated by the specific 
interpretive canon.  Thus, some pro-Congress scholars have argued that Congress should 
develop tools to reassert its institutional powers and re-equilibrate the perceived 
imbalance in war powers authority. 264 
In much of this normative war powers scholarship, a logically antecedent question 
is rarely addressed: If the courts are not likely to be involved in war powers controversies, 
why do we care about interpretive canons that are almost exclusively employed by the 
courts? Or to phrase the question a little differently, why would we expect the political 
branches that usually make decisions about the allocation of war powers to care about 
262 See John Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1643 (2002); John Yoo, 
Clio at War: The Misuse of History in the War Powers Debate, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1169, 1221 (1999). 
263 See id. at 1664 (observing that WPR has been weak in constraining executive authority and 
suggesting that the constitutionality of the WPR is questionable).   
264 See e.g., KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION, supra note __ at 185-207 (suggesting 
elaborate legislative proposals to give congressional role more bite in war powers).  
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such interpretive canons?  Presumably, many constitutional scholars would say that they 
should care because these interpretive canons provide mechanisms for discovering what 
the constitutional text specifically prescribes.   But hardly any of the political branches 
would concede that they are simply ignoring the Constitution when they make war 
powers decisions.   The more relevant question is whether the political branches should 
coordinate around any specific interpretive approach in circumstances where the 
constitutional text may be subject to different interpretations.  Mysteriously, none of the 
normative war powers scholarship seems to discuss why the political branches would have 
any incentives to take interpretive canons seriously.   For instance, does either Congress 
or the President really have any incentive to adhere to either historical fidelity under the 
originalist approach, or to other non-historical considerations under a more functionalist 
approach?     
 
The answer is probably not.  From a judicial perspective, one of the great virtues 
of interpretive canons is that they encourage stability in the law even if the courts do not 
all agree on the best one.265 Indeed, some commentators have observed that the 
institutional incentive that courts have in maintaining stability in legal interpretation 
makes them better interpreters of the constitution than the political branches.266 
Understandably, however, interpretive stability hardly seems to be a virtue for members of 
Congress who are subject to the whims of public opinion and face reelection concerns.267 
Indeed, because members of Congress are not bound by the same institutional incentives 
that encourage interpretive stability in the judicial branch, some commentators have 
argued that Congress may actually have an institutional advantage over the courts in 
interpreting those constitutional norms that change over time. 268 
In any event, given the presidential dominance of the national security agenda in 
most circumstances, Congress has an incentive to adopt an even more flexible approach 
to constitutional disputes regarding the allocation of war powers.  In other words, since 
the President can easily shape public opinion at the initiation of a conflict, members of 
265 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term--Foreword: Law 
as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 67 (1994) ("The usefulness of the canons ...does not depend upon the 
Court's choosing the 'best' canons for each proposition . . . [O]ften it is not as important to choose the best 
convention as it is to choose one convention, and stick to it."). 
266 See, e.g., Larry Alxander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1372-75 (1997). 
267 As one member of Congress being surveyed for a scholarly article put it: "Being a political body, 
Congress better have a different approach [to interpretation] or else they'll get voted out of office. Judges 
have life appointments. If members were elected for life then maybe this would be different."  Bruce G. 
Peabody, Congressional Constitutional Interpretation and the Courts: A Preliminary Inquiry into Legislative 
Attitudes, 1959-2001, 29 Law & Soc. Inq. 127, 162 (2004). 
268 See Peabody, supra note ___ at 161 (“While courts were somewhat slow to adapt their 
interpretation to changing social and political conditions (given, among other factors, their relative 
insulation from the public and the other branches), Congress could serve as an agent of innovation, 
ensuring that the Constitution applied to contemporary concerns.”); Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign 
Affairs, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 941, 980 (2004) (“[B]ecause the political branches are not bound by the same 
institutional constraints the courts face, they are better positioned to respond to changing norms in 
international relations.”) 
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Congress are likely going to resist any effort to take a “bright line” approach to 
constitutional interpretation on war powers issues.  Members of Congress are aware that 
“bright line” rules that mandate congressional intervention under certain circumstances 
are likely to expose them to unpredictable and considerable electoral risks.   
 
Moreover, to the extent that members of Congress engage in constitutional 
interpretation about the separation of powers at all, they apparently tend to rely more on 
local constituency feedback and political considerations in determining the meaning of 
textual provisions.269 Since members of Congress usually operate with limited legislative 
resources and crowded schedules, they are more likely to focus their attention on those 
constitutional issues that directly involve local and constituent concerns like federalism, 
separation of church and state, and individual rights issues.270 Constitutional questions of 
foreign affairs do not seem to factor heavily as a congressional concern.271 
Not only do electoral factors dissuade members of Congress from adopting 
interpretive canons that encourage stable rules, they also dissuade them from taking 
proactive legislative positions that would impose such bright line rules.  For instance, 
despite increasing calls by commentators to amend the War Powers Resolution to give it 
more bite, very few members of Congress have ever expressed any interest in expanding 
the congressional role under that statute.  On the contrary, influential members of 
Congress have actually lobbied rigorously to repeal the Resolution or radically narrow its 
scope.  Indeed, some of the most vocal support for legislative repeal has come from 
members of Congress who were not even from the President’s party.  For instance, both 
Robert Dole and Henry Hyde—leading Republican members of Congress—introduced 
legislation in 1995 that would repeal the Resolution under Clinton’s presidency.272 Newt 
Gingrich, the speaker of the house at the time, actively campaigned for Representative 
Hyde’s amendment and encouraged his fellow Republican members of Congress to take 
the unusual step of “increas[ing] the power of President Clinton.”273 
But Congress’s reluctance in imposing bright line rules does not necessarily 
translate to wholesale legislative abdication in the war powers realm.  This Article has 
shown that Congress will often employ a combination of both informal and formal 
mechanisms to constrain executive action in foreign affairs provided that there are 
discernible political payoffs for doing so.  Thus, it is not true to suggest, as some 
269 As one scholar analyzing congressional approaches to constitutional interpretation put it: 
“[M]embers of Congress [felt they] had a greater responsibility to apply and ‘assess the real world impact of 
[constitutional questions" including policy consequences and the likely reaction of the public.”  Peabody, 
supra note ___ at 161. 
270 See id.  at 150-51. 
271 See id. at 148, 150.  
272 Robert Dole proposed replacing the resolution with what he called the Peace Powers Act of 
1995, which in his words would “untie the President’s hands in using American forces to defend American 
interests.”  Wash. Post, Jan. 5, 1995, at A 10.  
273 141 Cong. Rec. H5648-01 (June 7, 1995).  
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commentators have, that “the President almost always seems to win in foreign affairs.”274 
To the contrary, members of Congress may often prefer to negotiate the division of war 
powers authority with the President using informal political approaches where formal 
legislative tools may prove to be either inadequate or politically imprudent.    Hence, the 
absence of formal statutory rules that establish bright line rules in war powers does not 
mean that the President always has the upper hand, it simply means that one ought to 
look elsewhere for a better understanding of political branch interaction in war powers.  
 
B.  Why the Courts are Unlikely to Tip the Balance of War     
Powers in Congress’s Favor  
Congress has for prudent political reasons often declined to use its formal powers 
to constrain the President in war powers issues.  But even if members of Congress seem to 
face significant domestic audience constraints in participating in war-powers issues, one 
might ask why the courts do not intervene to level the policy-making playing field.  
Indeed, one oft-cited antidote to the perceived “imperial” actions of the President in the 
war powers realm is judicial intervention.275 Judicial intervention, it is commonly argued, 
will tip the institutional balance of powers in Congress’s favor and encourage it to exercise 
its war powers prerogative.276 
There are two compelling reasons why courts have resisted, and will likely 
continue to resist, intervening in war powers disputes: (1) due to the political calculus 
that many members of Congress face, the courts usually assume that it is unlikely that 
there is a genuine confrontation between the two political branches on war powers 
disputes; and (2) the courts are probably reluctant to intervene in inter-branch disputes 
in a sphere where they might have low institutional authoritativeness.  
 
On the first point, the courts have been generally reluctant to protect legislative 
prerogatives in war powers when members of Congress have failed to do so.  Indeed, given 
that many members of Congress often have political incentives not to confront the 
President on war powers controversies, many of the disputes regarding the division of war-
powers that come before the courts routinely involve what are essentially intra-legislative 
disputes where a segment of Congress (often a minority) seems to disagree with the 
majority’s decision.  In most such cases a majority of Congress has either explicitly 
accepted the President’s national security agenda or has implicitly acquiesced to the 
agenda without taking formal legislative action.  In other words, in those cases there has 
not been a genuine constitutional impasse that might appropriately trigger court scrutiny.   
Courts, probably anticipating the political spoils at stake, decline to participate in a 
274 Harold Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra 
Affair, 97 YALE L J. 1255, 1317 (1988). 
275 See ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note __ at 54-67; KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
CONSTITUTION, supra note __ at 222-28. 
276 See ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note __ at 54-67. 
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“political pass the blame” game by insisting that the courts will not do what Congress 
refuses to do for itself.277 
Where members of Congress are unwilling to constrain executive branch 
authority through legislation, courts understandably recognize that judicial intervention 
might prove to be meaningless.  First, where there is insufficient congressional support for 
a court decision that favors congressional intervention in war powers, members of 
Congress will very likely lack the political will to implement such a decision.   In other 
words, members of Congress who fear that greater congressional intervention will expose 
them to electoral risks will have every incentive to sidestep a judicial ruling that awards 
them more powers in national security affairs.    
 
Second, courts will often lack the opportunity to monitor effectively the successful 
implementation of a bright-line judicial rule regarding the allocation of war powers.  
Judicial monitoring will often be difficult because there are so many procedural and 
jurisdictional hurdles to bringing a legal challenge to the allocation of war powers.  Since 
most citizens will lack standing to bring the lawsuit, most such lawsuits will probably have 
to come from members of Congress.  But even if disaffected members of Congress are able 
to overcome significant standing obstacles of their own,278 they are still likely to face a 
slew of other procedural obstacles, including ripeness,279 mootness,280 and the political 
question doctrine.281 
Thus, although greater political branch collaboration on use of force issues might 
be normatively desirable, those who argue that judicial intervention will prompt Congress 
to take a more active role in war powers are probably wrong.  Members of Congress are 
not likely going to embrace a war powers role that has significant electoral risks simply 
because such a role has been judicially sanctioned.  Indeed, not only will members of 
Congress lack an incentive to comply with such judicial decisions but judicial monitoring 
of legislative compliance will often prove very difficult to carry out.  At most, if compelled 
to take on a more active role by a judicial decision when it is not in their political interest 
277 See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (“If the Congress chooses not to 
confront the President, it is not our task to do so.”) (Powell, J., concurring); see also Campbell v. Clinton, 
203 F.3d 29 (2000) (holding that Congressmen challenging constitutionality of Kosovo intervention did not 
have legislative standing because legislative remedies were still available).  
278 Under current Supreme Court doctrine, legislative standing is available only when legislators’ 
votes have been completely nullified by the act of the president such as when there “constitutional impasse” 
between President and Congress.  See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 823 (1997). 
279 See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (observing that in 
disputes between the political branches have to be ripe for adjudication -- meaning there must be a true 
"impasse" between the branches).  
280 See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969) (holding that "a case is moot when the 
issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome."). 
 
281 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (listing six factors courts may use to determine if a 
case presents a non-justiciable political question); see also Nzelibe, supra note __ at 946-65 (discussing 
widespread application of political question doctrine in foreign affairs cases).  
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to do so, members of Congress will likely substitute legislative rubberstamping for silent 
acquiescence as the preferred response to the President’s use of force initiatives.  In sum, 
if greater political accountability for use of force decisions is the end goal, there is little 
evidence that judicially-prompted congressional intervention will change the current war 
powers landscape.   
 
Finally, the risk of non-compliance with judicial decisions also implicates the 
institutional legitimacy of the courts to adjudicate on war powers claims.  As some 
commentators have observed, courts seem to be especially wary about intervening in 
separation of powers issues in foreign affairs because the popular legitimacy that underlies 
judicial Resolution of domestic constitutional disputes does not tend to extend to foreign 
affairs disputes.282 In other words, when issues involve the adjudication of individual 
rights claims or domestic separation of powers disputes, courts can often tap into the 
popular acceptance of their role in resolving such disputes.283 In disputes regarding the 
allocation of war powers, however, it is unlikely that the judicial branch will be able to 
draw on the popular underpinnings of its legitimacy to secure political branch compliance 
with its decisions because there does not seem to much of a public appetite for increased 
judicial involvement in foreign affairs disputes. 284 Moreover, unlike in the domestic realm 
where the courts play a key legitimating function in separation of powers disputes, the 
political branches have very little incentive to embrace a more active judicial role in 
disputes over the allocation of war powers.285 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
For too long, the war powers literature has ignored the sometimes divergent 
incentives the political branches face in the context of an imminent military conflict or 
international crisis.  Indeed, much of that literature has tended to have a strong 
normative gloss informed by conventional interpretive canons like textualism, 
functionalism, or historicism.  To the extent that this literature attempts to explain 
political branch interaction in foreign affairs at all, it often assumes an “empire-building” 
agenda by the relevant domestic actors.  According to this view, the President has 
prevailed in the institutional struggle for supremacy in war powers largely because 
Congress has found itself without the proper tools to assert its constitutional prerogative.  
For proponents of increased congressional authority in war powers, the antidote to this 
perceived institutional imbalance is to have the judiciary step in and act as a bulwark 
against President’s intrusion on Congress’s war powers prerogatives.  
 
282 See Nzelibe, supra note __ at 987-92; Eyal Benvenisti, Judges and Foreign Affairs: A Comment on 
the Institut de Droit International’s Resolution on “The Activities of National Courts and International Relations of 
their State, 5 Eur. J. Int’l L 423, 426 (1994). 
283 See Nzelibe, supra note __ at 987-89. 
284 See id. at 989-90. 
285 See id. at 990; Benvenisti, supra note __ at 426. 
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This Article suggests that the reality of political branch interaction on war powers 
is much too complex to correspond to the prescriptions of any particular canon of 
constitutional theory.  In other words, despite the prospects of institutional tweaking by 
the courts or Congress, the political branches are not likely to have much of an incentive 
to conform their actions to what any specific interpretive canon prescribes, unless such a 
canon prescribes open-ended flexibility.  Rather, the political branches operate in an 
atmosphere where their institutional or constitutional prerogatives do not often align 
neatly with the electoral incentives of individual institutional actors.   
 
In this atmosphere, far from being hamstrung by its institutional arsenal, Congress 
has demonstrated that it is quite capable of constraining executive authority on the use of 
force when the electoral conditions are ripe.  Thus, while members of Congress may be 
understandably reluctant to challenge the President’s authority at the initiation of a 
conflict, they seem willing to constrain him in the shadow of a recent unpopular use of 
force.  Because of an academic bias towards formal congressional actions, however, much 
of the legal scholarship has actually underestimated the diverse ways in which Congress 
constrains the President’s war initiatives.  In many circumstances, informal legislative 
actions such as threats to cut-off spending or to derail the President’s legislative agenda 
are often as effective (and less institutionally burdensome) as passing formal legislation to 
terminate an unpopular war.  
 
Finally, the President has an incentive to seek congressional approval for the use 
of force when there is a significant enough risk that the war will go wrong.  The President 
either seeks legislative authorization as a form of political insurance in order to spread the 
electoral risks of military failure, or as a costly signal of the nation’s resolve to a foreign 
adversary. Unlike Congress, however, the President rarely follows the course of public 
opinion in his war powers initiatives.   Indeed, a presidential decision to capitulate to a 
foreign adversary in the face of declining public opinion polls is likely to be perceived as a 
sign of incompetence.  Thus, when there is a decline in public support for the use of force, 
the President is likely to escalate an international crisis and gamble on the revival of 
public support through strategic victories in the battlefield.   
 
